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I. INTRODUCTION
Like many kids who end up in Juvenile Court, Michael grew up too
fast.' Before reaching his teenage years, Michael smoked marijuana
regularly and attended school infrequently, if at all. Juvenile court first
intervened after the police arrested him for driving a stolen car when he
was eleven. The court placed Michael under the supervision of the
Probation Department and sent him back home to his mother, an
alcoholic who had little control over his actions. The Probation
Department enrolled him in a therapeutic day school, but within six
months, Michael was removed from three different schools: the first for
bringing marijuana to school, the second after a classmate sexually
abused him on the school bus and the third because he was defiant and
regularly truant. Michael returned to court because he violated his
supervision and underwent a psychological evaluation that concluded
that he should receive treatment at a residential home.
After sixteen months at a residential facility, Michael is now ready to
go home. He flourished under close supervision and treatment at the
residential home, making significant progress in his schooling and
eliminating many of the behavioral problems he previously exhibited.
His mother, meanwhile, did not progress as well. She failed to
cooperate with the family therapy and drug treatment provided by the
Probation Department and now refuses to allow Michael back into her
home, saying she does not want him.
Should the juvenile judge release Michael and hope for the best? Or,
should the judge keep him under the guardianship of the Probation
Department until his mother decides to take him back and, if she does
not, find him a different home? Juvenile judges routinely make such
complicated decisions. In this case, the decision involves more than
Michael's isolated delinquent act. The judge must consider the
circumstances that preceded his delinquent conduct, the needs of both
Michael and society, and the circumstances to which Michael will
return if the court releases him.
Before 1995, the judge would also consider whether to call in the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), the state agency
charged with keeping troubled families intact and promoting the welfare
of children. 2 However, in 1995, the Illinois legislature severely limited
1. This narrative is a composite of actual cases supplied by the Advocacy Unit, a special group
within the Cook County Juvenile Probation Department that serves delinquent minors who are at
risk and have a serious mental health diagnosis that requires out-of-home placement services.
Michael is not the minor's real name.
2. See infra Part III (discussing DCFS's role and emphasis on securing safe and permanent

2005]

Denying Child Welfare Services to Delinquent Teens

access to DCFS

927

services for teenagers who were adjudicated

3
In the vacuum
delinquent-for Michael, DCFS is not an option.
created by DCFS's absence, the judge must draw upon county resources
to provide Michael with a safe home, try to keep his family intact, and if
4
necessary, find Michael an alternative, permanent home.
This Article examines the legislative history and policy concerns that
led to the current delinquency restrictions, and argues that such a severe
limitation on DCFS involvement in the lives of teenage delinquents is
inconsistent with the guiding principles of the Juvenile Court Act
("Act"). 5 Part II discusses the origin of the Juvenile Court in Illinois

and provides an overview of how juvenile courts function in both child
protection and delinquency cases 6 Part III describes the role and
responsibilities of DCFS and how the agency interacts with juvenile
courts.7 Part IV traces the historical and legal developments that
culminated in the current provisions and examines their immediate and
long-term effects. 8 Part V revisits the founding principles that continue
to guide the Juvenile Court today and argues that the delinquency
restrictions conflict with these principles. 9 Part V also critiques the
rationale for the restrictions and further argues that the legislation has
0
repercussions that extend well beyond its intended effects.' Finally,
Part VI recommends that the Illinois legislature revise the current
homes for children).
3. Act of May 26, 1995, Pub. Act 89-21, ch. 5-15, § 5(1), 1995 I11.Laws 690, 696-97 (1995)
(codified as amended at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5 (2004)); Juvenile Court Act of 1987, Pub.
Act 89-21, ch. 15-15, § 2-10(2), 1995 Ill. Laws 782, 785 (1995) (codified as amended at 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/2-10 (2004)). See also infra Part IV.D (describing the effects of the restrictions
on delinquency proceedings).
4. See infra Part II.B.2.b (examining the post-adjudication options for courts in delinquency
cases).
5. Legislators and DCFS have cast the debate over the agency's role in the lives of teenage
delinquents in purely financial terms. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the financial motivations
underlying DCFS's lobbying efforts in favor of the delinquency restrictions); Part IV.C
(recounting the legislature's focus on the financial repercussions of the delinquency restrictions
when deciding how to amend the initial restrictions). This Article seeks to go beyond the fiscal
debate by focusing on the substantive issue of providing minors with appropriate and effective
care in a manner consistent with Illinois' historical approach to caring for youth that are in need
of state intervention.
6. See infra Part I (providing an overview of the origin of the Juvenile Court in Illinois and
how it functions).
7. See infra Part III (examining the role of DCFS, its theory of child welfare, and access to its
services).
8. See infra Part IV (discussing the legislation that resulted in the current delinquency
restrictions).
9. See infra Part V (arguing that the delinquency restrictions fail to abide by the basic
principles that underlie Juvenile Court).
10. See infra Part V (analyzing the rationale and effects of the current statutory framework).
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statutory scheme so that it is consistent with the guiding principles of
the Juvenile Court by allowing a court to consider the specific needs
and circumstances of every minor when determining whether DCFS
should provide care. 1

II.

OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE COURT

2
The Juvenile Court provides one point of access to DCFS services.1
This Part first discusses the foundations of Illinois juvenile courts, 3 then
describes how juvenile courts function in the context of both child
protection 14 and delinquency proceedings' 51

A. The Originsand Purpose of the Juvenile Court
Child advocates worked for decades to remedy the perceived
injustices of a legal system that treated children no differently from
adults, and their efforts culminated in the creation of the Cook County

Juvenile Court in 1899, the first juvenile court in the country. 6 The
court was a manifestation of the parens patriae doctrine, which
provides that the state has a duty to care for those, such as zhildren, who
cannot care for themselves. 7 As Judge Julian Mack, a prominent judge
11. See infra Part VI (recommending that a more flexible scheme be implemented that allows
a court to make a particularized finding concerning a teenage delinquent's access to DCFS
services).
12. See DCFS, PROCEDURES 304: ACCESS TO AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES § 304.5(a) (Jan. 30, 1987) (listing four ways that families come to the attention of
DCFS: (1)reports of child abuse or neglect; (2) referrals from other child welfare service
providers, other state agencies, or other states; (3) direct parent or caretaker request for services;
and (4) court orders adjudicating children "neglected, dependent, [and] delinquent (under age
13)").
13. See infra Part II.A (discussing the origins and purpose of Illinois juvenile courts in the
Act).
14. See infra Part ll.B.1 (explaining the steps to remove a child from a harmful situation and
place him in a safe and permanent home).
15. See infra Part ll.B.2 (describing the continuum of interventions that a court utilizes to
provide the most appropriate consequences for delinquent conduct).
16. See JULIAN W. MACK, The Chancery Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD,
THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 310, 310 (1925) ("Up to that time there was but one thought in
jurisprudence. If a child broke the law, he was treated as an adult."); GWEN HOERR MCNAMEE,
The Origin of the Cook County Juvenile Court, in A NOBLE SOCIAL EXPERIMENT? THE FIRST
100 YEARS OF THE COOK COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 1899-1999 14, 18 (Gwen Hoerr McNamee

ed., 1999) (detailing the efforts of numerous lawyers, judges, and social workers, as well as the
social and political factors, that culminated in the creation of the Cook County Juvenile Court).

17. See Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State
Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 527 (1996) (presenting parenspatriae).

Under its parens patriae power, the state may remove an abused or neglected child
from his or her parents' home and may, under certain circumstances, permanently
terminate all relationships and rights between parent and child. The state's compelling
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in the early days of the court,18 explained, the Juvenile Court was
originally created with the belief that the state had a responsibility to
deal with delinquent youth in the same way that a wise parent would
deal witb a disobedient child.' 9 Thus, the juvenile judge's role was not
to merely determine whether the child was guilty or innocent of the
specific crime, but also to examine the child's life as a whole in order to

protect the public safety while also guiding the child to an adult life of
good citizenship.2 °
The 1899 Illinois' Juvenile Court Act served as a model for the
nation, and by 1925, all but two states adopted similar approaches to
treating minors who were in need of a State's care.21 Under the current
22 (1)
version of the Act, such minors fall into two major categories:
interest in preventing harm to children justifies intrusion on the constitutional right to
parental custody.
Id. See also CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 14, 228 (3d ed. 1991)
(discussing the origin of the parens patriae doctrine in British common law and its major
influence on the development of the juvenile court in America); Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins
of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 201-08 (1978) (providing a detailed discussion of the
origins and historical development of the parens patriae doctrine). Parens patriae literally
translated from Latin means "parent of his or her country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 511 (2d
Pocket ed. 2001). The term generally means:
1. The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection
to those unable to care for themselves .... 2. A doctrine by which a government has
standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, esp. on behalf of someone who is
under a legal disability to prosecute the suit .... The state ordinarily has no standing
to sue on behalf of its citizens, unless a separate, sovereign interest will be served by
the suit.
Id.
18. SIMONSEN, supra note 17, at 228.
19. See MACK, supra note 16, at 310 (stating that when "a child ... broke the law [he or she]
was to be dealt with by the State, as a wise parent would deal with a wayward child"). Mack
went on to write that:
[T]he State is the higher parent; ... it has an obligation, not merely a right but an
obligation, towards its children; and that is a specific obligation to step in when the
natural parent, either through viciousness or inability, fails "so" to deal with the child
that it no longer goes along the right path that leads to good, sound, adult citizenship.
Id. at 312.
20. Id. at 314 (asserting that the juvenile judge has an obligation to not only ask a child, "[a]re
you guilty or innocent of the specific crime with which you are charged?" but also, "[w]hat are
you? How have you become what you are? Whither are you tending and how can we direct
you ... so that you may go along the straight path that leads to good citizenship?").
21. SIMONSEN, supra note 17, at 228-29. Maine and Wyoming, the two states that did not
join the initial wave of states that created a separate juvenile court, did so in 1945. Id. at 229.
22. The Act is comprised of seven articles. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-7 (2004). Article HI
addresses abused, neglected, or dependent minors. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2; and Article V
addresses delinquent minors. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5. Two other categories of minorsminors requiring authoritative intervention and addicted minors-are addressed in Articles III and
IV, respectively, but they are not relevant to the issue addressed in this article. 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/3-4. Articles II and V comprise the two major areas addressed by the juvenile court,
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abused,23 neglected,24 or dependent minors,25 (whose cases fall under the
heading of "child protection"); and (2) delinquent minors.26 The Act
has gone through many changes since 1899, but its core purpose echoes
the words of Judge Mack, which is to "secure for each minor subject
hereto such care and guidance" that will serve his best interests and the
best interests of the community. 27 To achieve this broad purpose, the
Act allows judges to liberally construe its language 28 and empowers
them with an array of options to address the needs of the minors, their
families, and their communities.29

as evidenced by the administrative restructuring of the Cook County Juvenile Court that took
place in 1994 under Donald P. O'Connell, Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court.
MARTHA A. MILLS, The Juvenile Court Today, in A NOBLE SOCIAL EXPERIMENT? THE FIRST
100 YEARS OF THE COOK COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 1899-1999 93, 93 (Gwen Hoerr McNamee
ed., 1999). Judge O'Connell created a separate Child Protection Division to hear abuse, neglect,
and dependency petitions, and a separate Juvenile Justice Division to hear delinquency petitions.
Id.
23. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3(2) (2004) (defining the actions that constitute abuse).
Generally, a person who is responsible for a minor's welfare commits abuse if she inflicts, or
allows someone else to inflict, any physical or emotional injury or sexual offense upon the minor,
or creates a substantial risk of such injury or offense. 705 ILL. COMp. STAT. 405/2-3(2)(i).
24. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3(1) (defining the conduct and omissions that constitute
neglect). A caretaker neglects a minor if he fails to provide the minor with necessary or proper
support, such as education and medical care, or with physical necessities, such as food, shelter,
and clothing. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3(1)(a). A caretaker who subjects a minor to a
potentially harmful environment or, for minors under age fourteen, leaves the minor without
supervision for an unreasonable period of time is also guilty of neglect. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/2-3(l)(b), (d). A mother who gives birth to a baby whose bodily fluids contain any amount
of a controlled substance is also guilty of neglect. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3(1)(c).
25. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-4 (2004) (enumerating the requisite conditions for a
finding of dependency). Generally, a minor is dependent on the state if his legal caretaker,
through no fault of his own, is unable to care for the minor's needs or if the minor has no legal
caretaker whatsoever. Id.
26. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-105(3) (2004) (defining a "delinquent minor" as "any
minor who prior to his or her 17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of
where the act occurred, any federal or State law, county or municipal ordinance").
27. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2(i) (2004).
28. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2(4).
29. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-23 (2004) (enumerating dispositional options after
a court has found the minor was abused, neglected, or is dependent); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/5-710, 715, 740 (providing the court with a variety of options when sentencing a minor found
guilty of criminal conduct, when setting the terms of their probation, and when placing a minor in
the legal custody of a guardian, or agency). For example, in the context of delinquency cases, the
court may restrict the minor's behavior by prohibiting the juvenile from entering a designated
geographical area as a term of probation, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715(2)(r), specify the
minor's educational training, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-740(l)(d), require the minor to
undergo certain medical or psychiatric treatment, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715(2)(d), order
the minor to make restitution for his delinquent act, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710(4), or even
mandate that the minor have a gang tattoo surgically removed, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5715(2)(s-5).
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B. The Juvenile Court in Practice

When a minor is before a juvenile court, the judge's ultimate goal is
to promote the overall welfare of the child3 ° and in delinquency cases, to
balance the child's welfare with the interests of the community and the

victim of the minor's conduct.3' This section describes the statutory

schemes that aim to accomplish these goals in both child protection and
delinquency cases. The first part describes the statutory provisions that
guide the judge in child protection cases to secure a safe and permanent
home for the child.32 The second part focuses on delinquency cases and
briefly summarizes the balanced and restorative justice model ("BARJ")
that the Illinois legislature embraced when it enacted the Juvenile
Justice Reform Act of 1998 ("JJRA").33 The section goes on to review
the statutory provisions and local initiatives created under the JJRA that
provide judges with pre-trial and post-adjudication alternatives to
detention in situations that will serve the best interests of both the minor
and the community.34
1. Child Protection Cases
A juvenile court may initially intervene at a temporary custody
hearing when a child has allegedly suffered abuse, neglect, or is
dependent.35
In a temporary custody hearing, the court evaluates
30. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2(1).
31. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101(1) (stating that the Illinois General Assembly created the
delinquency provisions of the Act with the intention of protecting the community and providing
the minor with "competencies to live responsibly and productively").
32. See infra Part II.B.1 (providing an overview of the statutory scheme in child protection
cases).
33. See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the basic tenets of the balanced and restorative justice
model).
34. See infra Part II.B.2.a-b (discussing the pre- and post-adjudication options available to
judges in delinquency cases).
35. When a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that a minor has been
maltreated, the officer has discretion to take custody of the minor without a warrant. 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/2-5(1). See also FRANK J. KOPECKY, ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC., Juvenile Law, in STARTING POINTS: FUNDAMENTALS OF PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS 3-1 §
3.63, at 3-27-28 (2001) (explaining that after an abused or neglected child is taken into custody
by a law enforcement officer, a temporary custody hearing must take place "within 48 hours,
excluding weekends and court holidays"). State intervention begins with a report of suspected
maltreatment to the State Central Registry (SCR) for Child Abuse/Neglect. ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 89, § 300.30 (2002). Child Protection Services Workers then investigate the report to
determine whether credible evidence of abuse or neglect exists. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, §
300.110(i). Even if the report is founded, the court will only remove the child from the home if it
is necessary to protect her health and safety. See DCFS, Chapter Four:Intake and Investigations,
in BEST PRACTICES § 4.16.1 (Oct. 2, 2001) (limiting the option of protective custody to situations
where the child faces imminent danger), available at http://dcfswebresource.prairienet.org/
downloads/bp/. See also supra note 25 (explaining that the term "dependent" refers to a child's
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whether there is probable cause to believe that the minor is abused,
neglected, or dependent, and whether there is an urgent and immediate

necessity to remove the child from his home. 36 The court must further
find that DCFS made reasonable efforts to eliminate the necessity of
removal by providing appropriate services.37 If removal is necessary,
the court can either place the minor in a "suitable place" designated by
the court, usually the home of a relative or some other temporary care
placement designated by DCFS.3 s The Act recognizes the importance of

timeliness when dealing with a child who has been removed from his
home.39 Accordingly, a minor cannot remain in temporary custody for
longer than ninety days.4 °
In order to keep the child in custody, the court must hold an
adjudicatory hearing before the ninety-day window closes 41 to
determine if the minor has been abused, neglected, or is dependent. 42 If
the alleged abusive or neglectful behavior is found, then the court may
find in a subsequent dispositional hearing43 that it is in the minor's best
interests" to become a ward of the court,45 thereby giving the court
dependence on the state due to his parent's inability to care for him).
36. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10. If the court does not find that there is probable cause to
believe the minor has been maltreated, the court must dismiss the petition. Id. The court may
also find that, although probable cause exists, it is not necessary to remove the child from his
home. Id. In this case the minor remains with his custodian until the adjudicatory hearing. Id.
37. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2). The court may also find that no reasonable efforts can
be made to eliminate the necessity of removal. Id. See also In re Patricia S., 584 N.E.2d 270,
275 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1991) (holding that a juvenile court must determine whether reasonable
efforts were made or were not required as part of the temporary custody hearing).
38. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2). The statutory term for this temporary placement is
"shelter care." Id. "Shelter" is defined as "the temporary care of a minor in physically
unrestricting facilities pending court disposition or execution of court order for placement." 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(14).
39. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-14(a) ("The legislature recognizes that serious delay in the
adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency cases can cause grave harm to the minor and the
family and that it frustrates the health, safety and best interests of the minor and the effort to
establish permanent homes for children in need.").
40. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-14(b). A court may continue the case under certain
circumstances, but only if it is in the best interests of the minor, and only up to thirty days. 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-14(c).
41. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-14(c) (stating that, if the adjudicatory hearing does not take
place within ninety days or the continued period, the petition shall be dismissed without prejudice
upon motion by any party).
42. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-21(2) (prescribing the procedure for an adjudicatory
hearing). A finding of abuse, neglect, or dependency must be based on the preponderance of the
evidence. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(1).
43. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-22. This dispositional hearing must occur within thirty
days of the adjudicatory hearing, though it may be continued for an additional period not to
exceed thirty days. Id.
44. A "best interest" determination is based on a variety of factors that account for the minor's
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power over the minor. 46 The court may commit the minor to one of four

entities: a suitable relative or other person, the probation department,
"an agency for care or placement," or DCFS.47 Child protection cases
progress against the backdrop of "permanency," a philosophy of
casework that prioritizes the child's interest in finding a safe and
permanent home.
With this end in mind, the court will set a
permanency goal for the child when he is initially placed 49 and ensure
that the services being provided to him and his family are focused on

achieving that goal.50
A minor who becomes a ward of the court remains under continual
court supervision. 5' The court must revisit the child's case every six
months to review the permanency goal and the service plan in a

"permanency hearing. 5 2 Based on a number of factors that contemplate
the totality of the minor's circumstances, from his mental and physical
well-being to the options available for permanence,5 3 the court will
physical and mental needs, as well as the minor's sense of belonging in his family and
surrounding community. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(4.05).
45. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-22. Even if the court found that the minor was abused,
neglected, or is dependent, the court may still order that the minor return to his parents or legal
guardians (if the child was removed from the home at the temporary custody hearing) or remain
with them (if the child was not removed) and order the caretakers to comply with services
provided by DCFS. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-23.
46. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(16) (defining a "ward of the court" as a minor who is
subject to the dispositional power of the court under the Act after a finding of requisite
jurisdictional facts).
47. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-23(1)(a)-(b), 2-27(l)(a)-(d). The court may also order that
the minor be placed in a subsidized guardianship with a suitable relative or other person, where
the caretaker receives payments to help care for the child. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(l)(a5).
However, DCFS must approve a subsidized guardianship in accordance with its
administrative rules. Id.
48. See infra Part III.A (describing the legislative efforts that have elevated safety and
permanency as the most important concerns of child welfare work).
49. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-22(1), 2-28. Some examples of "permanency goals" are to
return the minor home within five months or move the child towards adoption. 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/2-28(2)(A), (D).
50. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-23(3). While the court enters the goal and may require the
parties to comply with services aimed at achieving the goal, the court may not manage the
casework by ordering the entity that has custody of the minor, such as DCFS, to utilize "specific
placements, specific services, or specific service providers" to achieve the goal. Id.
51. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28 (requiring periodic review of the minor's case by the
court to re-evaluate the permanency goal and determine how to proceed with the case).
52. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28(2). The initial permanency hearing must be held within
twelve months of when temporary custody was taken. Id. If the parental rights of both parents
have been terminated, a permanency hearing must be held within thirty days of that order. Id.
53. Id. The court's evaluation must include the following factors:
Age of the child.
Options available for permanence.
Current placement of the child and the intent of the family regarding adoption.
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continue or revise the permanency goal to one of eight options 4
Wardship will continue until the minor turns nineteen years old or the
court determines that permanency has been achieved and the "health,
safety, and best interests of the minor and the public" do not require
further wardship.55
56
2. Delinquency Cases

In the last decade, legislative and programming initiatives have
focused on developing a continuum of intervention in the lives of
delinquent youth. Through the JJRA,57 the Illinois legislature attempted
to strike a balance between the rehabilitative roots of the Juvenile Court
and recent trends toward a more punitive system by enacting changes
based on the BARJ 8 BARJ recognizes that a minor's criminal action

Emotional, physical, and mental status or condition of the child.
Types of services previously offered and whether or not the services were successful
and, if not successful, the reasons the services failed.
Availability of services currently needed and whether the services exist.
Status of siblings of the minor.
Id.
54. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28(2)(A)-(G). Generally, the permanency goals focus on
returning a child to his home in the near future, terminating parental rights and placing the child
in an adoptive home, placing the child in a permanent home under the care of a guardian, or
placing the child in substitute care due to disabilities or mental illness, or because the child is over
age fifteen. Id.
55. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-31(1).
56. The Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over any minor under seventeen who violates or
attempts to violate federal, state, or local law. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-120. However, an
exception exists for minors at least fifteen years old who have been charged with more serious
crimes, like first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, certain instances of
aggravated battery with a firearm, armed robbery with a firearm, or aggravated vehicular
hijacking with a firearm. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(1)(a). These charges and other
charges stemming from the same incident are prosecuted under the criminal laws rather than the
Act. Id.
The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1988 changed some of the language that was distinct to the
juvenile justice system to be synonymous with criminal court. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-105.
Specifically, "dispositional hearing" was replaced with "sentencing hearing," and "adjudicated"
with "guilty." 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-105 (13), (17). This Article uses the former language
for ease of communication.
57. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1988, Pub. Act 90-590, 1998 I1. Laws 1035 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. and 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.).
58. See Daniel Dighton, Balanced and Restorative Justice in Illinois, THE COMPILER (Ill.
Criminal Justice Info. Auth., Chi., Ill.), Winter 1999, 4, 4 (reporting that the Juvenile Justice
Reform Act was an attempt to strike a balance between the competing theories of rehabilitation
and retribution); Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, THE COMPILER (Ill. Criminal Justice Info.
Auth., Chi., Ill.), Winter 1999, at 1, 9 (quoting one of the principal architects of the reforms as
saying that "the BARJ Model has great advantage over traditional models of juvenile justice,
which focus almost exclusively on either the treatment or punishment [of the minor]"). See also
Sacha M. Coupet, Comment, What to Do With the Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric
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harms the victim and the community, as well as the offender, and works
to restore each party to its original state.5 9 BARJ thus seeks to balance
the rights and interests of these three parties, which are sometimes at
odds, by creating a range of community-oriented interventions.6 ° In

practice, these interventions hold the minor accountable for his
conduct, 6' develop competencies" in the minor, and promote
63
reconciliation through dialogue between the offender and the victim.
In addition to implementing very tangible changes, legislators sought

to provide juvenile courts with a guiding principle that would unify both
the new and existing provisions with a common focus. 64 Under the
and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice
System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1317-27 (2000) (discussing the national legislative trends in
the early 1990s towards more punitive juvenile justice systems and arguing that the balanced and
restorative justice model provides an appropriate third alternative to a purely rehabilitative or
retributive model).
59. See Coupet, supra note 58, at 1341-45 (describing the philosophical underpinnings of
BARJ); PETER FREIVALDS, BALANCED AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROJECT (BARJ), I (Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, FACT SHEET No. 42, July 1996) (outlining the
basic principles of BARJ, which emphasize the importance of the victims, both the individual and
community, in the justice process).
60. Dighton, supra note 58, at 4. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101 (giving the purpose
and policy promoted through the 1998 changes to the juvenile justice system and mandating the
development of new programs that, for example, are community-based, are in close proximity to
the minor's home, involve the minor's family, and provide post-release services). One example
of a JJRA-created intervention is community mediation panels, which the State's Attorney may
establish to meet with victims, juvenile offenders, and their parents in a process to hold juveniles
accountable, to reimburse the victims and community that have been injured, and to offer the
juvenile offenders opportunities to develop skills necessary for development as positive members
of the community. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-310.
Critics of the JJRA have argued that the law uses the language of restorative justice but provides
little funding to implement the initiatives, while at the same time creating a more rigid juvenile
justice system by limiting the use of diversionary procedures, such as station adjustments, and
leaving automatic transfer laws intact. See Dighton, supra note 58, at 5 (quoting Steve Drizin of
the Northwestern University Legal Clinic); Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 58, at 10
(quoting Betsy Clarke, then part of the Juvenile Justice Counsel, Cook County Public Defender's
Office, as saying "[c]learly, restorative justice will be successful only if there are sufficient
resources to successfully divert youths from the juvenile justice system through competency
development. If these services are not in place, then restorative justice will not be balanced.").
See also KOPECKY, supra note 35, at § 3.17, at 3-9-10 (explaining the shift in philosophy ushered
in by the JJRA to one that emphasizes accountability and public safety).
61. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101(2)6).
62. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101(l)(c) ("[C]ompetency' means the development of
educational, vocational, social, emotional and basic life skills which enable a minor to mature
into a productive member of society.").
63. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-310(l)(2004) (establishing community mediation programs
with the goal of "mak[ing] the juvenile understand the seriousness of his or her actions and the
effect that crime has on the minor, his or her family, his or her victim and his or her community").
64. See Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 58, at 1, 9 (quoting one of the principal
architects of the reform provisions as saying that, because Illinois' delinquency statute did not
have a purpose statement, the JJRA intentionally created a conceptual framework that "will
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BARJ model and the JJRA, the court does not view a juvenile's conduct

in isolation, but rather in the context of his personal history and his
specific community. In doing so, the rights of the victim and
community are honored, as well as the place of the minor in that
community.65 Juvenile courts put this underlying philosophy into action
before and after minors are adjudicated delinquent.66
a. Pre-adjudication:Illinois Juvenile DetentionAlternatives Initiative

At a detention hearing, a court may detain a child awaiting
adjudication to achieve one of two purposes: (1) to ensure that the
juvenile appears in court; or (2) to safeguard the public from further
delinquent acts.67 Between 1987 and 1996, pre-adjudication detention

rates drastically increased across the country, including Cook County,
with the majority of detained youth residing in facilities operating above
their design capacity.6 8
In 1994, Cook County implemented a grant from the Annie E. Casey

Foundation

aimed

at

developing

responsible

community-based

alternatives to pre-adjudication detention that do not compromise public
safety.6 9 Through the collaborative efforts of the court, the Probation
Department, and other key entities such as the Cook County Board of
Commissioners, which operates the Juvenile Temporary Detention

Center ("JTDC"), Cook County developed a continuum of programs
provide our juvenile courts with specific guidance needed to effectively deal with the problem of
juvenile delinquency in our state").
65. See id. at 9 ("Under the BARJ Model the juvenile offender, the victim, and the community
in which they live, are all viewed as 'clients' of the juvenile justice system.").
66. There are also immediate intervention procedures that are intended to redirect delinquent
youth without coming before the court. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-300-30 (2004). Because
this Article focuses on options available to the court, these provisions are not discussed.
67. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-501(2).
See also A PARTNERSHIP TO REDUCE
UNNECESSARY DETENTION OF ILLINOIS YOUTH (Ill. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative,
Chi., Ill.), 1 (describing the role of pre-adjudication detention) [hereinafter Ill. Juvenile Detention
Alternatives Initiative]; Kopecky, supra note 35, §§ 3.40-3.41 (detailing the pre-adjudication
detention procedures).
68. See Bill Rust, Juvenile Jailhouse Rocked: Reforming Detention In Chicago, Portland,and
Sacramento, ADVOCASEY (Annie E. Casey Foundation, Balt., Md.), Fall/Winter 1999, at 1
(stating that pretrial detention rates across the country rose by thirty eight percent during that
period, with nearly seventy percent of the children housed in facilities operating above their
capacity), available at http://www.aecf.orglinitiatives/jdai/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2005). Cook
County's Juvenile Temporary Detention Center held an average population of about 800 juveniles
in the early 1990s, despite having a capacity of only 490. Ill.
Juvenile Det. Alternatives Initiative,
supra note 67, at 6.
69. Ill. Juvenile Det. Alternatives Initiative, supra note 67, at 6. See also The Annie E. Casey
Foundation, Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, at http://www.aecf.org/initiatives/jdai/
(summarizing the program and providing resources describing the implementation of JDAI
programs in different jurisdictions).
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that engage juveniles in positive and productive activities within their
communities. 70 The array of new programs was collectively labeled the
Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative ("JDAI").
Cook County has successfully implemented JDAI, resulting in a forty

percent drop in the number of juveniles in detention between 1996 and
2003.71

Moreover, ninety percent of the youth participating in the

alternative programs did not commit a delinquent act while awaiting

72
trial and attended their scheduled court dates on time. JDAI's success
in Cook County spawned the Illinois Juvenile Detention Alternatives
Initiative ("IJDAI"), which thirty-three counties throughout the state
have joined. 73 These programs have succeeded because they enable
juvenile justice professionals to assess the particular risk posed by the

individual juvenile before them, thereby eschewing any blanket solution
to the problem.74

As community-based solutions, the detention alternatives require that
the minor actually have a home. Some minors, however, do not have a

home to return to, because either their parents or guardians refuse to
pick them up from the juvenile detention center or they are simply
homeless. 75 These minors are considered "release upon request"
("RUR") minors, because they are free to leave the juvenile detention
7 6 In
center upon the request of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian.
such instances, the court will issue a summons directing the parent or
70. See Rust, supra note 68, at 4 (discussing the positive benefits of the collaborative
programs); JUVENILE PROB. AND COURT SERV. DEP'T, SUMMARY OF JUVENILE PROBATION AND
COURT SERVICES, PROGRAMS, AND INITIATIVES 9-11 (2004) (depicting the "Juvenile Detention
Alternatives Continuum" graphically). The alternatives provide a range of oversight, depending
on the particular characteristics of the minor, from evening reporting centers, where the minor
spends from 4:00 to 9:00 p.m. at a recreational center, to electronic monitoring. See id. at 8
(summarizing the various juvenile detention alternatives in Cook County).
71. See Timothy C. Evans, Letter to the Editor, Keeping Youths Out of Detention is Key
Priorityfor Court,CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., Feb. 3, 2004 (heralding the reduced detention rates in
Cook County).
72. Angela Rozas, More Kids Locked Up, Study Finds, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2004, at 1.
73. See 11. Juvenile Det. Alternatives Initiative, supra note 67, at 8 (showing a map of the
thirty-three participating counties as of May, 2003).
74. See generally Evans, supra note 71 (stating that the success of the program hinges on the
ability vested in the judge and other professionals to individually assess each juvenile).
75. Other scenarios may also leave a minor without a home to return to. For example, a court
will typically release a minor accused of sexually assaulting another minor in the same household
with the condition that he have no contact with the alleged victim (i.e., not reside in the same
home) while awaiting adjudication.
76. See STATE OF ILL. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, Agreement Attachment, Release Upon
Request § A (describing a RUR minor as "any youth [who is the subject of] a delinquency
petition . .. [who] a.) has been released by the court by an order to release the youth upon the
request of a parent, guardian, or custodian but; b.) remains in detention because no parent,
guardian, or custodian has appeared within seven (7) days of the RUR order to accept custody").
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guardian to report for a detention rehearing within seven days.77 If the
minor's caretaker does not appear at the rehearing, the court may order
the Department of Human Services ("DHS") to designate a suitable
placement for the minor while he awaits adjudication, such as a foster
home or group home. 7 ' DHS will fund the minor's placement and
provide services to the minor for up to thirty days.79
b. Post-adjudication
The court has a wide range of sentencing options at its disposal upon
adjudicating a minor, from dictating the minor's educational training to
ordering the minor to have a gang tattoo surgically removed.8 ° If the
minor does not belong in the Department of Corrections, yet the court
finds that the minor's parents or custodians are unfit or unable to care
for or discipline the minor, the court may order the minor into
placements that parallel the placement options available in child
protection hearings if it is in his best interests. 8' For example, the court
may place the minor with a relative or suitable caregiver, with an
outside agency, or under the guardianship of the probation department."
In Cook County, a division of the Probation Department called the
Advocacy Unit services teenage delinquents with serious mental health
diagnoses that require out-of-home placements.8 3 Similar to child
protection cases, the court periodically reviews placement decisions and
decides how to proceed.8 4
Although the Act empowers the court to take very similar steps in
delinquency and child protection placement hearings, the goals are not
identical in both proceedings.
A child protection court seeks to
expeditiously yet cautiously place the child in a safe and permanent
home, whether it entails returning the child to his previous home or

77. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-501(6) (2004).
78. Id.; STATE OF ILL. DEP'TOF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 76, § A.l.a.
79. STATE OF ILL. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 76, § A.4.a.
80. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710.
81. Compare 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-740 (empowering the court to place a juvenile
adjudged a ward of the court in the custody of a relative, under the guardianship of the probation
department, with an agency for care, with a training school, or in an appropriate institution) with
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27 (providing the same alternatives with the exception of the
training school and appropriate institution, but with the addition of DCFS and subsidized
guardianship placement options). The court makes the initial placement decision at the
sentencing stage. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710. See also supra note 47 and accompanying
text (discussing the placement options in child protection cases).
82. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-740(l)(a)-(c).
83. JUVENILE PROB. AND COURT SERv. DEP'T, supra note 70, at 47.
84. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-745 (2004).
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assigning him to a new home.85 The statutory scheme focuses on this
permanency goal, and in most cases, the court calls on DCFS, as the
86
state child welfare agency, to accomplish the goal. While the goals in
a delinquency case resemble those in a child protection case, they are
not identical. For example, there are no explicitly stated goals in the
7
placement hearings in delinquency cases." Rather, placement hearings
take place under the broad themes of balanced and restorative justice,
which recognize that the delinquent youth has committed some sort of
wrongdoing, and accordingly, the court has an obligation to ensure the
public safety and rehabilitate the minor.88 The statutes that govern
delinquency cases therefore do not share the same orientation towards
permanency.89 Still, like in child protection cases, placing the minor
with a different legal custodian is conditioned upon the malfeasance or
inaction of his caretaker. 90
Although the Act does not prioritize permanency in delinquency
cases, the statutory schemes in both child protection and delinquency
proceedings nonetheless share a common heritage that can be traced
back to the earliest days of the juvenile court. Under both types of
proceedings, the judge views the minor holistically, recognizing the
interdependence of all aspects of the child's life, not just the isolated
incident that brought the minor before the court.

III. DCFS:

THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES

Juvenile courts work closely with DCFS, a state agency created in
1964 with the goal of providing extensive social and family

85. See supra Part II.B (describing the focus of child protection hearings on safety and
permanency).
86. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (2004) (presuming DCFS involvement in cases where
a child is removed from his or her home, "so that permanency may occur at the earliest
opportunity").
87. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-740.
88. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101 (focusing on restoring the offending juvenile, the victim,
and the community, not "permanency" for the youth).
89. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(1.5) (2004) (governing placement hearings in
child protection cases and requiring the court to consider the success and appropriateness of
family reunification services); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28 (2004) (requiring periodic
permanency hearings at which the court shall determine the future status of the child and set one
of eight permanency goals). In contrast, the statute that governs a court's review of a placement
in a delinquency case makes no mention of permanency nor does it require the court to make a
determination concerning the future status of the child. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-745.
90. Compare 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(1) (requiring a determination that a minor's
parents or guardians are unfit or are unable to care for the minor before the court may place him
in the legal custody of another person or entity), with 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-740
(articulating the same standard before a court may place the child in delinquency cases).
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preservation services to protect and promote the welfare of children. 9'
Prior to the 1995 legislation,9 2 minors could access DCFS services in
juvenile court 93 either through the child protection proceedings

discussed above, or in Cook County delinquency cases, through two
service programs that were created in the 1980s as a result of class-

action litigation.

One program was the Governor's Youth Services

Initiative ("GYSI"), 94 a collaborative group that provided alternative
services for youth who were referred to juvenile court on a delinquency
petition yet did not require punitive measures. The other program
serviced RUR minors: those who did not belong in detention while

awaiting adjudication, yet were detained because they had no home to
return to. 95 This Part begins with an overview of DCFS, focusing
particularly on the agency's role in finding safe and permanent homes
for abused, neglected, and dependent youth.96 The second section
discusses the creation and role of the GYSI.97 The third section looks at
DCFS's responsibility to provide short-term care for RUR minors. 98

91. See generally 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5 (2004) (detailing DCFS's duties and obligations
in providing child welfare services). DCFS is also responsible for licensing and regulating child
welfare agencies, foster family homes, group homes, childcare institutions, and day care facilities.
DCFS, Chapter One: An Introduction to Child Welfare in Illinois, in BEST PRACTICES § 1.1.2
(2002), available at http://dcfswebresource.prairienet.org/downloads/bp/. DCFS has a five-point
mission statement:
Protect children who are reported to be abused or neglected and to increase their
families' capacity to safely care for them.
Provide for the well-being of children in our care.
Provide appropriate, permanent families as quickly as possible for those children who
cannot safely return home.
Support early intervention and child abuse prevention activities.
Work in partnerships with communities to fulfill its mission.
Id.
92. See infra Part IV (tracing the historical factors that led to the 1995 delinquency restrictions
and the 1996 amendment to the restrictions).
93. See DCFS, supra note 12, § 304.5 (listing four ways that families come to the attention of
DCFS: (1) reports of child abuse or neglect; (2) referrals from other child welfare service
providers, other state agencies, or other states; (3) direct parent or caretaker request for services;
and (4) court orders adjudicating children "neglected, dependent, [and] delinquent (under age 13)
..

").

94. See infra Part III.B (discussing the role of the GYSI).
95. See supra Part II.B.2.b (explaining the circumstances that lead to RUR status).
96. See infra Part II.A (discussing DCFS's role in finding maltreated children safe and
permanent homes).
97. See infra Part III.B (tracing the origins and purpose of the GYSI).
98. See infra Part llI.C (discussing the litigation that lead to DCFS's agreement to maintain
short-term residential care facilities to care for RUR minors).
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A. Agency Overview
DCFS provides child welfare services through two primary methods:
(1) the direct work of DCFS staff with children and families; and, or
alternatively, (2) through contracts with outside child welfare agencies
99
for foster care services or family preservation services. "Services," a
common term in child welfare parlance, generically refers to any social
program directed toward the goal of a particular case, such as reuniting
a child and his family. 1°°
DCFS prioritizes "permanency" as a cornerstone of effective child
welfare programming.0 1 Permanency means "providing a lifetime
commitment to a child in a setting where he or she is safe, can have a
'0 2
sense of belonging and well being, and can live to adulthood"' by
either re-unifying the child with his family, finding an adoptive home,
0 3 Successful permanency
or placing him in the home of a guardian.'
planning not only provides a strong foundation for meeting the child's
needs throughout his childhood, but also develops the life skills that a
°4
DCFS stresses the
child will need when he becomes an adult."
child's sense of
the
on
"based
casework
importance of conscientious
and permanent
caring
stable,
a
time and his or her urgent need for
0 5 From the family's first contact with DCFS until the child's
family."'
case is closed, DCFS workers concurrently develop alternative plans to
10 6
To help
ensure that a child does not languish in temporary care.
to
assigned
caseworker
one
achieve this goal, DCFS strives to keep
each case to provide continuity to the family and promote streamlined

99. DCFS, supra note 12, § 304.5. DCFS provides a wide array of services, such as
emergency family shelter, counseling, and drug treatment, to name a few. See generally ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 302 (2005) (describing available services).
100. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 302.20 (2005) (defining "child welfare services" as any
"publicly funded social services which are directed toward the accomplishment" of the agency's
goals, such as remedying the potentially harmful circumstances in a child's home, reuniting a
child with his family, or finding a permanent home for a child).
101. DCFS, Chapter Two: Permanency for All Children, in BEST PRACTICES § 2.2 (2002),
available at http://dcfswebresource.prairienet.org/downloads/bp/.
102.

fd. at § 2.1.2.

103. See DCFS, BUDGET BRIEFING: FY 2003 25 (2002) (giving placements through
reunification, adoptions, guardianships as the three primary indicators of permanency), available
at http://www.state.il.us/ dcfs/library/index.shtml.
104. DCFS, supra note 101, § 2.2.
105. Id. at § 2.2.
106. Id. at § 2.2.1 (adopting "concurrent planning," as opposed to sequential planning, as the
guiding philosophy in child welfare casework, and summarizing the concurrent planning as
"actively work[ing] toward one permanency plan while simultaneously preparing for or taking
steps toward an alternative permanency plan" in order to prevent multiple foster placement that
impair a child's ability to form normal attachments).
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1 7
and coordinated services. 0

DCFS's emphasis on permanence became more pronounced in 1997
with the passage of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act
("ASFA")10 8 and a group of Illinois laws referred to as the Permanency
Initiative. 10 9 ASFA amended some requirements in Title IV-E of the
Social Security Act, which provides federal funding to help defray the
costs of foster care services, in order to reduce the amount of time it
takes to achieve permanency." ° The Permanency Initiative, in part,
altered some of the mechanics of the Act and Adoption Act to establish
a more structured process to ensure that the court monitored each
child's move towards permanency' and reduce the amount of time it
took for a child to find a permanent home." 2 Under the new legislation
and changes in agency practices, DCFS has nearly doubled the number
of children that it moves from foster care to a permanent home on an
annual basis." 3
107. Id. at § 2.2.2.
108. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
109. See DCFS, supra note 91, § 1.1.1, at 3-5 (noting the effects of the Permanency Initiative
and the interplay between the Illinois laws and federal law).
110. See id. at § 1.1.1, at 3-5 (discussing the three most important federal laws in child
welfare, which includes Title IV-E of the Social Security Act). Examples of the requirements
contained in AFSA include: (1) a state must hold a judicial permanency hearing no later than
twelve months after the date a child entered foster care and at least every twelve months
thereafter as long as the child remains in foster care; and (2) a state must make reasonable efforts
to find an adoptive home for a child whose parents' rights have been terminated. DCFS, supra
note 91, § 1.1.1, at 5. For the first requirement, Illinois adopted a more stringent scheme
whereby, after the first permanency hearing, all subsequent permanency hearings are held at least
every six months. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28(2) (2004).
111. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28(2)(A)-(G) (giving eight permanency goals that
establish the future status of the child); id. § 405/2-28(2) (requiring the first permanency hearings
within twelve months from the date of temporary custody, and every subsequent hearing at least
every six months).
112. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D) (listing twenty-four grounds for terminating
parental rights and also providing for an expedited process to terminate parental rights under
extreme circumstances).
113. See DCFS, BUDGET BRIEFING: FY 2004 26 (2003) (charting the permanency rate in
1997, the year the new legislation was enacted, at 16.1%, and from 1999 to 2003 at 32.6%,
33.6%, 29.9%, 30.8%, and 32.3%, respectively), available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/
library/index.shtml. With the increased permanency rate came a reduction in the average time a
child stays in foster care, from thirty-four months in 1996 to twenty-five months in 2003. Id. at
27. This continued a trend that saw the time in foster care reduced from forty-four months in
1993 to thirty-four in 1996. Id.
While the changes in law and social work practice are certainly significant factors in reducing
time in foster care, the overall caseload in the Illinois' child welfare system was reduced over the
same period of time: the number of reported cases of abuse or neglect in the state declined from
136,312 in 1994, to 119,447 in 1997, to 104,264 in 2004. DCFS, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2004 3, available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/
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B. The GYSI: The Governor's Youth Services Initiative
The controversy over allocating responsibility for the care of
14
In 1979,
delinquent youth existed well before the 1995 legislation.
of
behalf
the Cook County Public Guardian filed suit in federal court on
a class of children with emotional, physical, or mental disabilities who
had been adjudicated delinquent or had delinquency petitions
pending."' Because of the minors' disabilities and the typically nonserious nature of the crimes, juvenile court judges sought to place them
with various state agencies that could provide treatment and care for
them rather than impose punitive measures." 6 The plaintiffs alleged
that three state agencies-DCFS, DHS (formerly the Department of
Mental Health and Development Disabilities ("DMHDD")), and the
Illinois State Board of Education ("SBE")-violated the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 by refusing to assume responsibility for the children's
needs because of their disabilities." 7 All of the defendant-agencies
maintained that the children were either too disabled or not disabled
enough to receive the services they provided, 1 8 resulting in the
library/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2004). Some researchers believe that there is
insufficient data to conclude that the increased adoption rates, and therefore increased
permanency rates, are due to the Adoption and Safe Families Act. See generally FRED WULCZYN
ET AL., ADOPTION DYNAMICS: THE IMPACT OF THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT (2003)
(finding that it is too soon to determine the impact of the Adoption and Safe Families Act on the
adoption rates in Illinois), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/categoryeditor-new.asp?
L2=61 (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
114. See infra Part IV.A (describing DCFS's lobbying efforts to reduce the agency's
responsibility to provide services to delinquent youth).
115. David B. v. Patla, 950 F. Supp. 841, 843 (N.D. 111.1996).
116. Id.
117. Id. After amending their complaint, the plaintiffs ultimately brought their claim under §
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance.
Petition for Writ of Cert. at 3, David B. v. McDonald, 156 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 1998) (No. 98-1016)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)) (alterations in original). The class alleged that the defendantagencies denied them services solely because of their disabilities. Second Amended Complaint at
B15-B16, David B. v. deVito, No. 79 C 1662 (N.D. 11. Sept. 4, 1980), Petition for Writ of Cert.,
David B. v. McDonald, 156 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 1998) (No. 98-1016). The plaintiffs also alleged
that the defendants violated their constitutional equal protection rights by assuming a special
relationship with them and then denying them adequate care. Id. at B 17.
118. David B. v. Patla, 950 F. Supp. at 843. According to the plaintiffs, DHS withheld
services because the minors did not require extended hospitalization; DCFS acknowledged that
the children were neglected or abused, but maintained that the neglect or abuse did not require
placement outside of their homes, or alternatively that the minors were too disruptive to be placed
with other DCFS children; and SBE disavowed any responsibility for the youth because, although
they had special education needs, their residential placement needs brought them under the
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children's needs going unmet.' 19
The parties resolved the lawsuit in late 1981 by entering a Consent
Decree.' 2 ° The Consent Decree was a binding agreement that created
the GYSI, a collaborative group made up of representatives of each
defendant-agency that focused on providing child welfare, mental
health, and education services to children seventeen or younger 21 who
were referred to Cook County Juvenile Court because of delinquent
conduct.122 The Consent Decree created the GYSI to ensure that the
population of children who needed services, yet were historically
shuffled between agencies because they failed to meet eligibility
requirements, would receive appropriate care and treatment under the
least restrictive conditions.1 23 In practice, juvenile court judges referred
minors to the GYSI when they determined, after hearing evidence
concerning the delinquency petition that committing the child to the
Department of Corrections would be inappropriate. 2 4 With the input of
the Advocacy Unit, 125 the GYSI determined the most appropriate
services for the minor and apportioned responsibility for providing
26
those services among the three agencies.'
purview of the other agencies. Id.
119. Id. ("As a result, these children 'fell between the cracks,' and were left to fend for
themselves at the [Department of Corrections] or on the streets.")
120. Id. at 843-44.
121. If the minor was already a ward of the Juvenile Court, the upper age limit was twenty.
Consent Decree at D4, David B. v. Pavkovic, No. 79 C 1662 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1980), Petition for
Writ of Cert., David B. v. McDonald, 156 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 1998) (No. 98-1016) [hereinafter
Consent Decree].
122. A minor who was "referred" to Juvenile Court was either the subject of an intake
screening or was taken into custody and the subject of an investigation. Id. at D3.
123. Id. at D4-D5.
124. Declaration of Sheila Nicolai at El, Petition for Writ of Cert., David B. v. McDonald,
156 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 1998) (No. 98-1016) [hereinafter Declaration].
125. Id. The Advocacy Unit served as the liaison between the juvenile court and GYSI. Id.
The unit investigated the background of each minor, facilitated referrals, and participated in
GYSI meetings, but had no say in the ultimate decision of how to assist the minor. Id. Because
the GYSI no longer exists, the Advocacy Unit now directly serves the same population, roughly
filling the GYSI's former role, by linking the youth with appropriate services. See JUVENILE
PROB. AND COURT SERV. DEP'T, supra note 70, at 47 (describing one of the Advocacy Unit's
duties as recommending appropriate services and identifying the funding sources from either
DCFS, the Chicago Board of Education, or DHS).
126. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 311.3 (2003). The four basic functions of the GYSI were to:
Assist in conflict resolution over disagreements between state agencies and/or the
juvenile court in accessing or planning appropriate services for multi-problem youth;
Assist in case planning, management, and coordination for multi-problem youth whose
problems are not the clear responsibility of any state agency;
Identify policy, procedural, and programming gaps in the network of state and local
community service systems;
Promote the development of a full continuum of in-state programs to meet the needs of
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In 1986, the Illinois General Assembly officially created the GYSI in
terms that closely tracked the language of the Consent Decree.' 27 Yet,
the legislature's commitment to the program was mixed: while the new
statute emphasized the importance of meeting the needs of "multiproblem youth,"' 28 the existence of the program was contingent upon the
availability of program funds. t2 9 Still, according to the Probation
Department, the GYSI operated effectively and without incident for
fourteen years, placing virtually every referred child in residential
placement. 30
C. Release Upon Request Minors

RUR minors in Cook County comprised an additional class that
gained access to DCFS services in the 1980s through a class-action

lawsuit. 3 ' In January 1985, a class of RUR juveniles in custody at
the
Cook County JTDC filed suit in federal court against the JTDC
superintendent and Cook County, alleging that the defendants violated
their rights by indefinitely incarcerating them while awaiting
adjudication, despite a finding that detention was unwarranted. 32
In

multi-problem youth.
Id.
127. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 311 (giving the operating rules
for the GYSI); see also
infra note 188 (explaining the rulemaking process). Compare 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 505/17a- 11
(2004) (codifying the existence of the GYSI for the purpose of "offer[ing]
assistance to multiproblem youth whose difficulties are not the clear responsibility of any
one state agency, and who
are referred to the program by the juvenile court" and stating that the
decision-making body of the
GYSI "shall be composed of State agency liaisons appointed by the Secretary
of Human Services,
the Directors of the Department of Children and Family Services
and the Department of
Corrections, and the State Superintendent of Education"), with Consent
Decree, supra note 121,
at D4 (guaranteeing appropriate care and treatment for youth who
"[a]re in need of specialized
services not limited to child welfare, mental health and education"
yet "[hlave been denied
appropriate services by one or more of the defendant[-agencies]
... after having made the
necessary applications for such services"). In accordance with the
statute, DCFS promulgated
rules and regulations governing the operation of GYSI.
128. "'Multi-problem youth' means youth with multiple problems
in domains of mental
illness or retardation, emotional disturbance, juvenile delinquency, serious
criminal offense, child
abuse or neglect, behavioral disorders, or educational handicapping
conditions." ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 89, § 311.2 (2005).
129. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 05/17a- 11 (2002) (stating that the
provision of services is
contingent upon the "availability of program funds and the overall needs
of the service area").
130. Declaration, supra note 124, at E2, E4. Residential placement
was defined in the
Consent Decree as "[c]ustody or substitute care [that] is away from
the home of the child's
parents in a facility providing care for children, including but not limited
to foster homes, group
homes and child care institutions..." Consent Decree, supra note 121,
at D3.
131. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (describing the
circumstances that lead to
RUR status).
132. Consent Decree § I., A.T. v. County of Cook, No. 85 C 0325 (N.D.
Ill. May 23, 1986).

946

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

some cases, minors were held for months or even as long as a year."'
There was a swift response to the lawsuit. In July 1985, the Presiding
Judge of Cook County's Juvenile Division ordered that judges subpoena
parents and guardians to appear at court within seven days for 3a4
detention rehearing, in an attempt to avoid unnecessary detention.
Although DCFS was not a party to the lawsuit, it agreed to enter
negotiations in August 1985, and ultimately agreed to oversee the
creation of two specialized foster homes for RUR minors. 13 By 1987,
the Illinois General Assembly essentially codified the Presiding Judge's
order and DCFS's agreement to provide care for RUR minors. 13 6 Thus,
RUR minors would default into receiving DCFS care until they were
reunited with their families or the court held their adjudicatory hearing.
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM-THE DELINQUENCY RESTRICTIONS

The Consent Decree forced DCFS to fund a number of residential
placements that otherwise would not have been the agency's
responsibility. When DCFS faced rising costs in the early 1990s, it
advocated for delinquency restrictions in order to vacate the decree and
conserve resources. This Part reconstructs the historical antecedents
and effects of the delinquency restrictions. First, this Part discusses the
passage of the new legislation and the GYSI's role as a catalyst for the
restrictions. 37 Second, this Part looks at the demise of the GYSI that
accompanied the passage of the restrictions and the litigation that
ensued because juvenile courts continued placing delinquent minors in
DCFS custody in direct opposition of the new provisions. 138 Third, this
Part pieces together the legislative steps and accompanying debate that
resulted in an exception to the delinquency provisions.139 Finally, this
Part describes how the delinquency restrictions have altered child
protection and delinquency proceedings and the effects DCFS has felt
since the passage of the restrictions.' 4°
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, 805-10(7) (1987) (requiring a summons be issued to a parent,
guardian or custodian if none of them appear on behalf of a child).
137. See infra Part IV.A (describing the role of the GYSI in enacting the delinquency

restrictions).
138. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the demise of the GYSI and the appeals that resulted from
circuit court decisions that contravened the new amendments).
139. See infra Part IV.C (tracing the legislative process that created the current form of the
delinquency restriction).
140. See infra Part IV.D (recounting the long-term effects of the delinquency restriction on
DCFS access).
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A. The Delinquency Restrictions
Between fiscal years 1991 and 1995, DCFS's budgetary needs
expanded by 170%, largely because of the tripling of costs associated

with placing children in residential care (both GYSI referrals and DCFS
wards). 14' Because the GYSI typically placed minors in residential care
facilities operated by private providers, the Consent Decree merely
shifted the financial burden of paying for the care of these troubled
youth from Cook County to the state agencies. 142 The children who
juvenile court judges referred to the GYSI were never adjudicated
abused or neglected, and consequently were never ordered into DCFS
custody. 143 As a result, DCFS's relationship with these children only
extended to the financial obligation to pay for the placement.' 44 Over
time, the criminal conduct of GYSI referrals became45 more severe, and
the costs associated with their care rose significantly.
The ballooning residential costs stemmed not only from GYSI
placements, but also from judges in other counties indiscriminately

placing delinquent juveniles in DCFS care without a genuine case of

141. Audio tape: Hearing on H.B. 2915 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary and
Criminal Law, 1996 Sess., 89th Gen. Assembly (Ill. 1996) (March 7, 1996) (statement of Jess
McDonald, Director, DCFS) (on file with author) [hereinafter Testimony of Jess McDonald].
142. See David B. v. Patla, 950 F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (describing the operation of
the GYSI and stating that, because none of the defendant agencies operated the type of residential
facilities that most of the referred youth require, the children are typically placed with private
treatment providers who then bill the respective agencies for the cost, with DCFS bearing
approximately one-third of the cost); see also Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141
(noting that placing juveniles in residential care through the GYSI "is a way to pay for an
alternative to corrections," and that DCFS does not provide the full range of services to GYSIreferrals that it would to DCFS wards).
143. Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141 (testifying that the juveniles were "not
[referred to GYSI] because of any finding of neglect or abuse"). See Declaration,supra note
124, at E2 ("The court does not commit the children [referred to the GYSI] to DCFS or place
them in custody of DCFS.").
144. See Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141 (criticizing the current system that
allowed courts to require DCFS to pay for out-of-state residential placements for children that
DCFS was not otherwise involved with).
145. See Patla,950 F. Supp. at 844 n.4 (noting that, although it was irrelevant to the court's
decision, DCFS complained that the treatments proposed by the GYSI were becoming more
expensive because of the increasingly dangerous propensities of the children referred to the
GYSI). Near the end of the GYSI's operation, there were ninety-six children receiving services,
and some of them had been charged with crimes that included first-degree murder, domestic
violence, sexual assault, and robbery. Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141. The
Advocacy Unit's supervisor acknowledged that the crimes of GYSI-referrals ranged "from
nonviolent acts to domestic violence to violent crimes," including two youths who were charged
with first-degree murder, but noted that "[t]he court bases its referral to GYSI on the overall
unmet needs of the child rather than the specific charges in the delinquency petition."
Declaration,supra note 124, at E2.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

maltreatment. 146 As an agency charged with protecting abused and

neglected children, DCFS asserted that the juvenile courts improperly
utilized the state's child protection system, which diminished the

resources available to children who had a more legitimate need for
DCFS services and care. 14 7 DCFS maintained that it was being forced to
care for kids who simply were not its responsibility, and that local
counties
could provide a more appropriate response to the population's
148
needs.

In order to foreclose its obligation to fund the placements of

delinquent juveniles under the Consent Decree, DCFS pushed for
legislation that would clearly state that delinquent teenagers were
ineligible for the agency's care. 14 9 DCFS succeeded, and in 1995 the
Illinois legislature passed new legislation barring any minor thirteen or
older charged with a criminal offense or adjudicated150 delinquent from
being placed in the custody of or committed to DCFS.
B. Immediate Effects of the Legislation
This section describes the events that ensued in the years immediately
following the passage of the delinquency restrictions. This section
recounts DCFS's successful effort to eliminate its obligations under the
146. See Audio tape: Hearing on H.B. 2915 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary and
Criminal Law, 1996 Sess., 89th Gen. Assembly (Ill. 1996) (Feb. 29, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Spangler, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary and Criminal Law) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Testimony of Rep. Spangler 1] (explaining that the impetus for the 1995 delinquency
restrictions was the fact that "[m]any of the [juvenile court] judges were indiscriminately making
all of the children wards of the state"); see also Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141
("[Wie exercise no control [over the placement of delinquent children with DCFS], in fact many
times the decisions are made before we are even called. In many jurisdictions no one has the
courtesy to call the DCFS caseworker and say 'We have a problem, will you help us deal with it.'
They say 'We've made the decision, we're placing the kids."'). Because juvenile court judges
were not permitted to sentence children to DCFS under the pre-1995 statute without DCFS
consent, presumably judges would find the child abused or neglected and then commit him to
DCFS custody. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-23(1)(a) (1994) (held unconstitutional by People v.
Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1999), amended and re-codified at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5710 (2002)).
147. See Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141 (describing the decision to use DCFS
funds to pay for treatment of delinquent youth as an improper allocation of DCFS resources).
148. See id. (arguing that community-based systems developed by the counties serve as a
better solution to the problem of servicing delinquent youth than forcing DCFS to pay for
residential placement).
149. See id. (informing the committee that DCFS advocated for the 1995 legislation in order
to vacate the 1981 GYSI Consent Decree).
150. Act of May 26, 1995, Pub. Act 89-21, § 5-15, 1996 I11. Laws 673, 696 (codified as
amended at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5(1) (2004)); Act of May 26, 1995, Pub. Act 89-21, § 1515, at 785 (codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10); id. at 789 (codified as
amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27); id. at 797 (codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/5-710).
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GYSI Consent Decree 5 ' and then briefly describes how some juvenile
court judges attempted to sidestep the new restrictions
and continue to
52

place delinquent teenagers in DCFS custody.1

1. Extinguishing the GYSI Consent Decree
In July of 1995, less than a month after the delinquency restrictions
became effective, DCFS notified the Cook County Juvenile Court that it
would no longer abide by the Consent Decree.' 53 The original claim

underlying the decree alleged that DCFS, as well as the other defendantagencies, violated the Rehabilitation Act by denying the minors services

they

were

"otherwise

qualified"

for based

"solely"

on their

disabilities. 5 4 DCFS reasoned that with the changes to its enabling
statute 155 and the Act' 56 that barred it from taking custody of teenagers
charged with a crime or adjudicated delinquent, the basis for the claim

disappeared-the minors were no longer "otherwise qualified" for
DCFS services nor were they denied the services "solely" because of
their disabilities. 5 7 The agency maintained that it was simply obeying
the laws of Illinois, and as a result, there was no longer a substantial
federal claim under the Rehabilitation Act that
granted the federal court
58
jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree.
After three years of litigating the vitality of the Consent Decree in
light of the new legislation, the Seventh Circuit ultimately decided that
it could not enforce the decree because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 59 Because the terms of the Consent Decree no longer
151. See infra Part IV.B.l (summarizing the litigation that followed the passage of the
delinquency restrictions to determine if the Consent Decree was still binding).
152. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the attempts of some juvenile courts to place minors in
DCFS care despite the new restrictions).
153. The applicable portions of P.A. 89-21 became effective on June 6, 1995 and July 1, 1995.
Act of May 26, 1995, Pub. Act 89-21, 1996 I11.Laws 673, 701, 789, 791, 799. On July 5, 1995,
DCFS officials informed the Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Justice Division of the Circuit Court
of Cook County that it would no longer participate in GYSI. Declaration,supra note 124, at E4.
154. See supra note 117-20 and accompanying text (explaining the basis for the original
claim that led to the GYSI Consent Decree).
155. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5(1) ("A minor charged with a criminal offense ... or
adjudicated delinquent shall not be place in the custody of or committed to [DCFS] by any
court ... ").
156. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2) ("A minor charged with a criminal offense.., or
adjudicated delinquent shall not be place in the custody of or committed to [DCFS] by any
court .... ); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710(l)(a)(iv) (stating that a minor who is found guilty
may be "placed in the guardianship of [DCFS], but only if the delinquent minor is under 13 years
of age ...").
157. David B. v. Patla, 950 F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
158. Id.
159. David B. v. McDonald, 156 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1145
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applied to the agencies and the statute that codified the decree was never
binding to begin with, the GYSI ceased to function.' 6°

(1999).
160. Id. Initially, the District Court denied the defendants' motion to vacate the Consent
Decree. David B. v. Patla, 950 F. Stipp. at 851. Consent decrees may be modified or vacated if
"the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). The Supreme Court has
instructed district courts to modify or vacate a consent decree under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) only
if there is "a significant change either in factual conditions or in law." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992). In addition to the grounds articulated in Rufo, DCFS
urged the District Court to adopt the reasoning of the plurality opinion in a recent Seventh Circuit
decision, which stated that a decree should be vacated if no substantial federal claim is -found
underlying the plaintiffs' complaint. David B. v. Patla, 950 F. Supp. at 845-46 (citing Evans v.
City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1082 (1994)) [hereinafter
referred to as Evans III].
The District Court did not embrace the reasoning from Evans III, and went on to focus on
whether (1) there were any significant and unanticipated factual changes since the parties agreed
to enter the Consent Decree; or (2) there were any changes in the law that made lawful the
conduct that the Consent Decree prevented. Id. at 845-46. DCFS argued that, under the statutory
changes made through P.A. 89-21, it no longer was in violation of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, since the plaintiffs were not "otherwise qualified" for DCFS's services, nor
were they excluded "solely by reason" of their disability. Id. at 847. The District Court
disagreed. Id. at 847. First, although it was far from conclusive that the minors were
discriminated against solely on the basis of their disability, the court found enough uncertainty to
conclude that DCFS failed to carry its burden. Id. at 848. Second, the new provisions prevented
delinquent teens from being placed in DCFS custody, but did not preclude DCFS from providing
services to these minors. Id. at 850. Because minors referred to the GYSI were not placed in
DCFS custody but were only given necessary services, the changes in the law did not affect the
fact that the minors were still "otherwise qualified" for those services. Id. at 850-51.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case for the District
Court to decide, among other things, whether the Consent Decree was in compliance with the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that states may not be sued in federal
court unless they unequivocally consent to it or Congress abrogates the immunity. David B. v.
McDonald, 116 F.3d 1146, 1148, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997); David B. v. McDonald, No. 79 C 166,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19529, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 1997). Notwithstanding the Eleventh
Amendment, state officials may be sued if they are acting outside of their authority by violating
federal law, but the court should terminate litigation at the point when the state brings itself in
conformity with national law. McDonald, 116 F.3d at 1148. On remand, the District Court held
that Illinois complied with federal law in 1986 when it passed a statute, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/17a- 11, that essentially codified the Consent Decree by formally creating the GYSI for
providing services to multi-problem youth. McDonald, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19529, at *19.
Because the 1986 statute brought the state into conformity with federal law, the District Court
vacated the Consent Decree without reaching the other issues the Seventh Circuit instructed it to
deal with. Id. at *19-20.
However, soon after the District Court vacated the Consent Decree, DCFS notified the court that
it would no longer provide services formerly required by the Consent Decree, removing the basis
for the court's decision. David B. v. McDonald, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2982 *4 (N.D. Ill. March
10, 1998). The District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and resumed its
analysis according to the instructions of the Seventh Circuit. Id. The court began by applying the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Evans III, which it previously chose not to adopt, to
determine whether there was a substantial federal claim to support the plaintiffs' suit. Id. at *4-5;
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2. Enforcing the Delinquency Restrictions
The legal ripples caused by the passage of the restrictive provisions
did not dissipate after the litigation over the binding nature of the
Consent Decree. In counties throughout the state, juvenile judges
hearing child protection cases disregarded the new restrictions and
continued to place teenage minors with delinquent pasts in the custody
of DCFS.' 6' Judges justified sidestepping the restrictions by favoring
other portions of the Act that either relegated the restrictions to the
context of delinquency hearings 162 or subjugated the restrictions to the
overarching theme of serving the child's "best interests.' 63
Nonetheless, the language of the new provisions clearly extended to
see McDonald, 116 F.3d at 1149-50 (chastising the lower court for disregarding its plurality
opinion in Evans III). Deferring to the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, the District Court held that a
minor's delinquency provides a separate reason for denying services, and hence the defendantagencies do not deny the minors services solely on the basis of the minors' disabilities and,
therefore, there is no federal claim under the Rehabilitation Act. McDonald, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2982 at *10. But the District Court did find a substantial federal claim in the plaintiffs'
due process claim and held that the class of minors do have a constitutional right to adequate
shelter and basic therapeutic treatment while in the state's care. Id. at *17-20. Rather than craft
a new decree to ensure these due process rights were protected, the District Court resurrected the
1981 Consent Decree and modified it in two ways: (1) DCFS was allowed to abide by state law
and deny custody to any delinquent minor over thirteen; and (2) any minor referred to GYSI
under the decree needed to be a ward of the state in order to substantiate the due process claim.
Id. at *20-23. The end result was to keep the GYSI program intact in nearly its original form.
See Id. at *22 (stating that DCFS's responsibility to provide services under the Decree is not
modified).
The life of the reinstated Consent Decree was short. The Seventh Circuit again reversed the
District Court, this time dismissing the proceeding for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. David
B. v. McDonald, 156 F.3d at 784. Although the plaintiffs included their due process claim in their
original complaint, the Seventh Circuit asserted that because the theory of the litigation moved
from the Rehabilitation Act to the Due Process Clause at the appeal stage, the identity of the
appropriate defendants changed from those named in the original 1980 complaint, who denied
services to the youth, to those who actually have custody of the minors and are in a position to
violate their due process rights. Id. at 783-84. Although the court implies that a due process
claim would have been defeated, it did not reach the issue on the merits. Id. at 782-83.
"[Ajlmost 20 years old, this case has reached the end of the line." Id. at 781.
161. See, e.g., In re A.A., 690 N.E.2d 980 (I11.
1998) (reversing a St. Clair County district
court's decision which held the legislation unconstitutional); In re C.M., 669 N.E.2d 707 (Ill.
App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1996) (illustrating the disregard for the restrictions Kankakee and Will Counties
district courts); In re C.T., 666 N.E.2d 888 (I11.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1996) (showing how a district
court in DuPage County defied the restrictions).
162. See In re CT, 666 N.E.2d at 890-91 (evaluating the respondent's argument that,
although the amendatory language appears in the DCFS enabling statute, in Article II of the Act
(which governs abuse, neglect, and dependency hearings) and in Article V (which governs
delinquency proceedings), the legislature's purpose was only to restrict the juvenile court's
sentencing options in delinquency cases).
163. See In re C.M., 669 N.E.2d at 710 (addressing the argument "that Public Act 89-21 is
invalid because it restricts trial courts' authority to name custodians in accordance with the best
interests of the affected minors").
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both delinquency and child protection hearings, and on appeal,
reviewing courts unequivocally stated that the juvenile courts lacked
authority to contravene the words of the statute.' 64 The delinquency

restrictions even prohibited DCFS from consenting to custody of
teenage children it deemed appropriate for agency care if a child had
any delinquent history.

65

Furthermore, equal protection challenges to

the constitutionality of Illinois' decision to deny access to DCFS's
services to certain delinquent minors were futile.I' 6 Thus, the new law
proved to be an absolute bar on any DCFS involvement with teenage
delinquents.
C. The "IndependentBasis" Exception and DCFS Rulemaking

Judging from the swift response by the Illinois General Assembly and
the ensuing committee discussions and floor debates, many state
legislators either did not take note of the amendatory language nestled
in the massive budgetary bill or did not anticipate its impact.1 67 One
164. See id. ("The Act delineates the authority of the circuit courts, and the 'best interests of
the child' standard must operate within these limits."); In re C.T., 666 N.E.2d at 891 (holding that
a statutory construction that limits the amendments to delinquency proceedings is implausible
given the plain language of the statutes in question).
165. See In re CT., 666 N.E.2d at 890-91 (dismissing the statutory construction proffered by
DCFS that would allow it to take custody of a minor if he suffered abuse, neglect, or dependency
that was not related to the minor's delinquency).
166. In re A.A., 690 N.E.2d at 983; In re C.M., 669 N.E.2d at 710-11; In re C.T., 666 N.E.2d
at 893. In re C.T. provided the seminal constitutional analysis that courts relied upon in
considering later cases. In re A.A., 690 N.E.2d at 983 (noting that the In re C.M. court followed
the sound reasoning of In re C.T., and endorsing the conclusions of those courts). The
respondents in In re C.T. argued that the legislation should be strictly scrutinized because,
although juveniles do not constitute a suspect class, the amendments implicate the fundamental
liberty interest of parents in the care and custody of their child. In re C.T., 666 N.E.2d at 892.
The court rejected this notion, stating that the statutes do not affect custodial rights, but a minor's
right to be placed with DCFS. Id. Instead of applying strict scrutiny, the court examined whether
a rational basis existed for classifying minors based on their delinquency. Id. This test was easily
satisfied, as the court looked to any plausible justification for the legislation-such as to preserve
scarce funds for the core population of abused or neglected minors with no delinquent histories,
or to protect younger and more vulnerable children from the potential dangers posed by teenage
delinquents. Id. at 893.
167. See Audio tape: Hearing on H.B. 2915 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary and
Criminal Law, 1996 Sess., 89th Gen. Assembly (I11.1996) (Feb. 29, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Hoffman, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary and Criminal Law) (on file with author)
(linking the unforeseen fiscal impacts of P.A. 89-21 to the hasty passage of the bill, and
remarking that "[tihat's what happens when a $33 billion budget gets put on peoples desks at nine
o'clock in the morning and gets voted on at noon"); id. (March 7, 1996 ) (statement of Rep.
Turner, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary and Criminal Law) (on file with author)
(doubting that issues created by the restrictions in P.A. 89-21 were ever addressed because, if
they were, "it would have sent up a red flag, because there are a lot of problems with the
legislation" that we enacted) [hereinafter Testimony of Rep. Turner 1]; see also In re A.A., No.
96-JA-33 (Ill. Cir. Ct., 20th Cir., July 22, 1996) (ordering A.A. into DCFS custody and declaring
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legislator characterized the prior bill as a last-minute DCFS initiative
68
that "started us in all this mess" and needed to be promptly remedied.
Another legislator, in a more heated speech, decried DCFS's attempt to

"jettison all these kids" as an "absolutely disgraceful" tactic motivated
by an interest in shifting the financial burden to the counties.

69

By

February 1996, eight months after the new provisions became effective,
curtail the sweeping
legislators introduced House Bill (H.B.) 2915 to 170
care.
DCFS
from
teenagers
delinquent
exclusion of
According to Representative Spangler, the new bill's sponsor, the

original delinquency restrictions did not implicate other juvenile justice

and child welfare issues; he asserted that it was "a money issue and a
money issue only."' 7' He noted that the immediate effect of the

restrictions shifted the cost of caring for certain juvenile delinquents
from DCFS to counties unprepared to shoulder the economic burden,
leaving them in an unexpected fiscal crisis. 172 The original form of H.B.

2915 aimed to undo the drastic cost-shifting by striking the73restriction
altogether.
on delinquents in temporary custody proceedings

At hearings before the House Judiciary-Criminal Committee, DCFS
the amendments enacted through P.A. 89-21 unconstitutional, while noting the dearth of
legislative debate as an indication that there is no rational basis for the restrictions).
168.

89TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 87-88 (May 9, 1996, Ill.)

(statement of Rep. Scott) Rep. Scott went on to add:
[W]e know that [DCFS's] glaring concern for the kids last year was to dump them into
the counties where they knew a lot of kids wouldn't get serviced at all. We knew that
their overriding concern was a financial one. It wasn't one based on the best interest of
the children, it was one based on the best interest of their own particular budget ....
Id. at 90.
169. Id. at 133 (March 27, 1996, Ill.) (statement of Rep. Dart, Member, House Comm. on the
Judiciary and Criminal Law) (positing that "DCFS, in an effort to cut down on their numbers and
cut down on their expenses, was dumping these kids on the counties").
170. 3 LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1996
SESSION OF THE 89Th GENERAL ASSEMBLY, STATE OF ILLINOIS 1995 (Ill. Mar. 10, 1997) (on file

with author) (stating the H.B. 2915 was filed on Feb. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Legislative Synopsis].
171.

See Audio tape: Hearing on H.B. 2915 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary and

Criminal Law, 1996 Sess., 89th Gen. Assembly (Ill.
Spangler, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary
(arguing that the other issues that other witnesses
muddle the issue, and encouraging those present

1996) (March 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
and Criminal Law) (on file with author)
were present to testify about would only
to focus on the basic budgetary issue)

[hereinafter Testimony of Rep. SpanglerI1].
172. See Testimony of Rep. Spangler I, supra note 146 ("A number of different counties have

become quite concerned with the cost of this-it was never in fact their charge, but in fact the
charge of the [DCFS].").
173. House Amendment No. I to House Bill 2915 (Feb. 29, 1996) (on file with author). See
Testimony of Rep. Spangler 11, supra note 171 (stating that "[aill this bill does, simply put, is
reverse language that became Public Act 89-21 in 1995" in order to relieve counties of sudden
financial burdens created by that Act).
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Director Jess McDonald urged the lawmakers to leave the original
restrictive language intact because the agency's budget simply could not
accommodate the placement needs of youth charged with delinquent
conduct, such as those that were previously placed with DCFS through
the GYSI or whose conduct did not warrant detention but have no home
to return to. 174 McDonald painted a grim outlook if the General
Assembly reversed the provisions, warning the lawmakers to "consider
the possibility that we'll close the [Cook County Juvenile Temporary
Detention Center] and refinance 400 kids plus that are there [awaiting
adjudication] on an ongoing basis.' ' 175 To McDonald and others
testifying before the committee, the appropriate solution was to focus on
community-based alternatives rather than rely on DCFS for any aspect
76
of juvenile corrections.
However, not all lawmakers thought this was purely a budgetary
issue. Under the strict language of the delinquency restrictions, DCFS
could disavow responsibility for a RUR minor whose parents essentially
abandon him by refusing to pick him up when the minor did not require
pretrial detention 177 or, after satisfying his sentence, was no longer a
ward of the juvenile court. 78 Some legislators believed that this
scenario would constitute "one of the highest degrees of neglect" that
would require DCFS involvement. 7 9 DCFS did not claim that it should
174. See Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141 (stating that the cost of residential
placement for all children has tripled in the previous five years, and, if delinquents are allowed
back in DCFS care, "[iut will be a problem that I will not be able to control fiscally, that I will not
be able to control programmatically"). See also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text
(discussing those youth who the court determines do not need to be detained pending
adjudication, but have no home to return to).
175. Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141.
176. See id. (emphasizing the need for counties to develop "a community-based juvenile
correction system" as an alternative to DCFS's costly involvement); Hearing on H.B. 2915
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary and Criminal Law, 1996 Sess., 89th Gen. Assembly
(I11.
1996) (March 7, 1996) (statement of Dallas Ingemunson, Member, Legislative Committee on
Juvenile Justice) (urging the lawmakers to maintain the language introduced in P.A. 89-21
because it served as "an incentive to local governments to find ways of solving the problems of
kids at risk in Illinois" and, although "there's some pain" that accompanies such changes, "it is
not time ... to retreat").
177. See supra Part III.C (discussing DCFS's role in providing services to RUR minors before
the delinquency restrictions).
178. See 89TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 129-30 (March 27, 1996,
I11.)
(statement of Rep. Spangler) (acknowledging the dispute over who should care for delinquent
youth abandoned by their caretakers and stating that H.B. 2915 would allow DCFS to continue
with their current policy of denying services to such minors).
179. Id. at 130 (statement of Rep. Spangler) (speaking on behalf of a coalition of lawmakers).
See also Testimony of Rep. Turnerl, supra note 167 (asking "[w]hy in the world would DCFS not
become involved" in a situation where "[plarents never come to pick up a minor released to them
by the delinquency court"); 89TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 131-32
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have no role in that instance, but instead maintained that there were
more appropriate community programs, such as Comprehensive
Community Based Youth Services ("CCBYS"), to handle these

children."8

CCBYS is a network of agencies that service "lock-out" minors:
youth who cannot return home after being away for a period because

their parents are unable or refuse to care for them."' CCBYS provides

short-term shelter care for minors and intensive reunification services in
8 2 If the shortan attempt to keep them out of the child welfare system.
83
term services are unsuccessful, CCBYS refers the minor to DCFS.
McDonald was unclear in his committee testimony as to whether DCFS
would accept a minor when CCBYS was unsuccessful in reuniting him
to his family, 8 4 but rather he focused on the importance of using
CCBYS185 at the initial point of lock-out to alleviate the pressure on
DCFS.
Despite DCFS resistance, H.B. 2915 became law after undergoing
three amendments. 8 6 The final version of the bill still applied only to
temporary custody hearings, but instead of completely repealing the
delinquency restriction in such hearings, an amendment allowed access
(March 27, 1996, I11.) (statement of Rep. Turner) (criticizing the bill's failure to hold DCFS
accountable for the care of abandoned delinquents as its "particular flaw").
180. See Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141 (responding to a question as to whether
DCFS would have no part in abandonment situations by saying, "No. We're not saying that.
We're saying that there is a Youth Service System in that case that could respond in many of
those instances, and do[es]...").
181. See Letter from D.D. Fischer, Chair, Board of Directors, West Central Community
Services, to Tom Ryder, Co-Chairman, Joint Committee on Administrative Rules 1 (Jan. 12,
1998) (on file with the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules) (describing, as a provider in the
CCBYS system, the population of minors that they serve); see also infra note 189 and
accompanying text (giving the DCFS definition of a "lock-out"). RUR minors comprise a subcategory of minors CCBYS focuses on. See supra Part III.C (discussing the characteristics of
RUR minors).
182. See Letter from C. Gary Leofanti, President, Illinois Collaboration on Youth, to Tom
Ryder, Co-Chairman, Joint Committee on Administrative Rules 2 (Dec. 26, 1997) (on file with
the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules) (stating that a CCBYS provider typically provides
five to six days of intensive family reunification services in an effort to place a child back in his
home without calling upon DCFS).
183. See id. (stating that DCFS will only take responsibility for the minor after the intensive
reunification services have failed).
184. See Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141 (stating on the one hand that "[i]t is not
the purpose of the child protection system" to care for locked out youth, but also stating later that
the agency is "not saying that" they have no part in a lock-out situation).
185. See id. (emphasizing the need for community programs to address lock-out situations).
186. Act of July 31, 1996, Pub. Act 89-582, § 5, 1997 I11.Laws 2457 (codified as amended at
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10 (2004)). The bill passed unanimously, 113-0-0. Legislative
Synopsis, supra note 170, at 1994.
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to DCFS care for delinquent teenagers for whom "an independent basis
of abuse, neglect, or dependency exists."' 87 The Illinois General

Assembly deferred to DCFS, because of its superior expertise in child

welfare, to define what constituted an "independent basis" through the
rulemaking process.1 88 The final version of the rule stated that DCFS
187. The House Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law recommended the passage of
H.B. 2915 in its original form, which would have struck the delinquency restriction completely in
temporary custody proceedings, by a vote of 11-2-2. Legislative Synopsis, supra note 170, at
1995. But the extent of H.B. 2915 was curtailed as it proceeded through the General Assembly,
with the following qualifying language added in order to ensure that only truly abused or
neglected minors would be placed with DCFS: "If, however, a separate petition alleging the
minor is neglected or abused has previously been filed or filed after the arrest or adjudication and
the minor was placed in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services, the
above restriction on placement shall not apply." House Amendment No. 2 to House Bill 2915
(March 27, 1996) (adopted by the General Assembly).
Significantly, no exception existed for separate dependency petition-when a minor is without a
legal caretaker or the caretaker is unwilling or unable to care for the minor-which is the type of
maltreatment often suffered by lock-out victims. See supra note 25 and accompanying text
(summarizing the conduct that constitutes dependency); Testimony of Rep. Turner I, supra note
167 (saying that a child who is not picked up by his family after being released "strikes me as a
dependent child"). But see 89TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 129-30
(March 27, 1996, 11.)
(statement of Rep. Spangler) (lamenting the same situation as "one of the
highest degrees of neglect"). Whether a lock-out amounts to neglect or dependency will likely
depend upon the culpability of the parent or guardian, the dependency statute applies to parents
and guardians who could not care for their children due to "physical or mental disabilit[ies]," or
"through no fault, neglect or lack of concern," or who wishes to relinquish responsibility with
"good cause." 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-4 (2004). The neglect
statute does not address any
factors that would mitigate the fault of the parent or guardian. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3.
Despite concerns that these abandoned minors might be denied DCFS care under the current form
of the bill, the House voted in March 1996 to pass the bill and ship it to the Senate by a vote of
106-3-5. Legislative Synopsis, supra note 170, at 1995.
The Illinois Senate altered H.B. 2915 to require, rather than a separate abuse or neglect petition,
that "an independent basis of abuse, neglect, or dependency exists" in order for a teenager with a
delinquent past to be eligible for DCFS care (notably inserting a dependency exception into the
bill alongside the abuse and neglect exceptions). Senate Amendment No. 1 to House Bill 2915
(April 25, 1996).
188. 89TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 89-90 (May 9, 1996, Ill.)
(statement of Rep. Spangler). The sponsor of the bill summed up the sentiments of the chief
architects of the bill: "It will end up being [DCFS's] decision, and it was felt that, that was better,
them being the experts in that field rather than left up to the courts." Id. Rep. Scott, on the other
hand, was extremely distrustful of DCFS because of the effects of P.A. 89-21, and asked his
fellow legislators "how [they know] that the departmental rule isn't going to be just as bad or
worse than that Bill [P.A. 89-21] was?" Id. at 88 (statement of Rep. Scott). Scott went on: "So, I
guess I'm scared, quite frankly, just to say 'Well that is fine. Let's let a departmental initiated
rule come forward and then it will all be fine again?' Id. at 90. Still, the checks and balances
built into the Administrative Rulemaking process were enough to assure the members of the
House that the rule would be fair and true to their intent. Id. at 90 (statement of Rep. Spangler).
All rules are subject to the rulemaking procedures specified in the Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act ("IAPA"). 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5, et seq. (2002). The proposed rules must go
through two consecutive notice periods of at least forty-five days each. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
100/5-40(b)--(c). During the first notice period, the text of the new rule or amendment must
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would not accept for custody, care or services minors thirteen or older
"for whom allegations of adjudication or abuse, neglect or dependency
arise from the same facts, incident or circumstances which give rise to a

charge or adjudication of delinquency unless the minor" is already in
DCFS care.19
appear in the Illinois Register, along with the statute that authorizes the rule and, if applicable, the
text that is being replaced or amended. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-40(b)(1)-(3). The agency must
also provide a brief description of the subjects addressed by the proposal, the anticipated
procedural changes required to comply with the rule, and, if the rule was based on any research,
instructions on how to obtain the study. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-40(b)(3.5)-(4). The IAPA
also requires the agency to provide the public with the opportunity to comment on the rule. 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 100/5-40(b)(5).
After the initial forty-five day period, agencies must then provide written notice to the Joint
Committee on Administrative Rules ("JCAR"). 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-40(c). The second
notice is not as exhaustive as the first: it must contain the proposed and amended text, a
"regulatory flexibility analysis" that takes the comments of small business owners during the first
notice period into account, and, if requested by JCAR, an analysis of the economic and budgetary
effects of the proposed rulemaking. Id. During the second period, JCAR may raise objections to
the rule or notify the agency that no objections will be issued. Id. After the agency addresses any
objections, the rule must be certified with the Secretary of State, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-65(a),
and published in the Illinois Register. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-40(c).
189. 22 Ill. Reg. 18843, 18846, (Oct. 16, 1998) (amending ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, §
304.4). The first version of the rule also excluded "lock-out" minors from DCFS eligibility with
the following provision:
The Department shall not accept for care or services a minor 13 years of age or older
for whom a finding of abuse, neglect, dependency or delinquency is due solely to what
is generally categorized as "lock-out." "Lock-out" is defined as the failure or refusal
of the parent or guardian, for whatever reason, to continue to resume providing for the
care and guidance of a minor, including physical custody, following an absence from
the home of any duration for any reason. The term "lock-out" applies only if the
parent or guardian refuses or fails to make provision for other living arrangements for
the minor.
21 Ill. Reg. 13220, 13223, Issue 40 (Oct. 3, 1997) (amending ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4).
During the comment period, however, a number of organizations that participate in the CCBYS
wrote JCAR to voice their opposition to the "lock-out" provision because it would leave minors
over twelve for whom the intensive reunification services did not work, and who were then
typically referred to DCFS, without any alternatives. See Letter from D.D. Fischer, supra note
181 (stating that this amendment will have the unintended effect of increasing the number of
children on the streets); Letter from Ron Moorman, Executive Director, Child Care Association
of Illinois, to Tom Ryder, Co-Chairman, Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (Jan. 9, 1998)
(voicing strong opposition to the lock-out amendment); Letter from Peter D. Cunneen, Executive
Director, The Bridge Youth & Family Services, to Tom Ryder, Co-Chairman, Joint Committee
on Administrative Rules (Jan. 9, 1998) (urging JCAR Co-Chairman to stop the lock-out
amendment because it will leave many children without refuge); Letter from Denise Loveland,
Supervisor/Therapist, Youth Attention Center, to Tom Ryder, Co-Chairman, Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules (Jan. 5, 1998) (asking JCAR Co-Chairman to oppose the lock-out
amendment "for the well-being of the youth involved" and warning that a failure to do so will
render a number of children homeless); Letter from C. Gary Leofanti, supra note 182 (warning of
the drastic effects of the lock-out prohibition for a the minors who could not be reunified with
their families).
The concerns raised by the CCBYS organizations effectively convinced DCFS to remove the
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Throughout the legislative process, lawmakers were primarily

concerned with "put[ting] the responsibility back on the agency of
DCFS to accept the juveniles that they should have taken in the first

place."' 90 Yet H.B. 2915 created an exception in the temporary custody

statute alone, which allows a juvenile court to order DCFS care for a
maximum of ninety days.' 9' The legislative record does not mention
why the exception was not extended for the full duration of an abused,
neglected, or dependent child's time as a ward of the court.
D. Long-Term Effects of the Legislation
Since the passage of the 1996 amendment to the original delinquency
restrictions, Illinois has not altered its policy towards teenagers with
delinquent histories that need DCFS assistance. The policy requires that
an independent basis of maltreatment must exist for the minor to obtain
agency services, and even then, a judge may not order DCFS
involvement beyond the ninety-day temporary custody window. This
lock-out provision when the rule was re-issued on second notice. See Notice to Joint Committee
On Administrative Rules, DCFS 2-3 (July 27, 1998) (citing the concerns of the organizations that
protested the lock-out provision and concluding, therefore, to "delet[e] references to and the
definition of 'lock-out' from the proposed amendments"). The second, and final, version of the
rule removed the lock-out provision, but also stated that the agency would not accept delinquent
minors for care or services as well as legal custody or guardianship. 22 Ill. Reg. 18843, 18846,
Issue 42 (Oct. 16, 1998). The temporary custody statute, which authorizes this rule, only
prohibits delinquent youth from being placed in the custody of or committed to DCFS by any
court and makes no mention of withholding care or services. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2)
(2004).
By including care or services in the delinquency restriction, DCFS was likely attempting to
preclude the arrangement imposed by the GYSI Consent Decree, which required DCFS and other
agencies to provide services to a minor without a court committing the minor to any agency's
custody. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (detailing the appeal process and discussing
the relevance of the fact that services were not prohibited in the delinquency restrictions). At the
time DCFS submitted this version of the rule to JCAR, the Federal District Court had temporarily
revived the Consent Decree and noted that, while Illinois law prohibited DCFS from taking
custody of delinquent teens, the agency was "permitted under state law to continue to participate
in the provision of services" to delinquent youth. David B. v. McDonald, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2982, *22 (N.D. Ill. 1998). The case was decided on March 10, 1998. Id. at *23. DCFS
submitted the rule changes for second notice to JCAR on July 27, 1998. Notice to Joint
Committee On Administrative Rules at I. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
Consent Decree on Sept. 28, 1998, David B. v. McDonald, 156 F.3d 780, 780 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1145, and the final form of the rule became effective on Oct. 1, 1998. 22
I11.
Reg. 18843, 18846, Issue 42 (Oct. 16, 1998). Whatever the reason for including the extra
language, JCAR did not object to this change and the rule was certified. See supra note 188 and
accompanying text (discussing the rulemaking process and noting that, on second notice, JCAR
has an opportunity to object to the rule and, after any objections are addressed, the rule is certified
with the Secretary of State).
190. 89TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 127 (March 27, 1996, Ill.)
(statement of Rep. Spangler).
191. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2), 2-14(b) (2004).
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section discusses how the delinquency restrictions impacted the
93
statutory schemes in both child protection 192 and delinquency cases

changes in DCFS since the
and describes some of the agency-wide
194
reform legislation took effect.

1. Child Protection Cases
Before 1995, a juvenile judge only considered a child's history of
delinquent conduct in child protection proceedings insofar as that
history affected decisions about where to place a child and what service
plan was appropriate. 95 Such conduct did not affect a judge's ability
under the Act to place a minor in DCFS custody or order the agency to
provide a minor with services. Under the current statutory scheme,
however, a judge may not place a teenager who has been charged with a
crime or otherwise adjudicated delinquent in DCFS care or custody,
unless the alleged abuse or neglect that the minor has suffered is
1 96
Even then, the court
independent of the child's delinquent conduct.
with DCFS for the
custody
may only place the teenager in temporary
97
days.
ninety
of
period
statutorily limited
If the court does declare the minor to be a ward after the adjudicatory
and dispositional hearings, a strict interpretation of the placement
statute does not allow the court to place a teenage minor with DCFS if
he has a delinquent past, regardless of whether the maltreatment was
independent of the delinquency. 98 Even without the option of DCFS
192. See infra Part IV.D.1 (describing the effect of the restrictions in child protection
proceedings).
193. See infra Part IV.D.2 (describing the effect of the restrictions in delinquency
proceedings).
194. See infra Part IV.D.3 (reporting that, between 1995 and 2003, DCFS has reduced the
statewide residential caseload for children over twelve and stabilized its budget).
195. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10, 2-27 (1994) (allowing juvenile courts to place minors
with DCFS in temporary custody or for long-term care and services without any qualification for
a delinquent past).
196. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2), 2-27(d) (2004).
197. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2).
198. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27 (providing no "independent basis" exception at the
dispositional stage that follows temporary custody and adjudication). In practice, juvenile courts
might place the delinquent teen in DCFS's care as part of the dispositional hearing, but this would
contravene the express language of the statute. As discussed above, removing a minor from his
home and placing him in the legal custody of another custodian is a three-step process: 1) there is
a temporary custody hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe the minor was
maltreated and there is an urgent and immediate need to remove him from his home; 2) there is an
adjudicatory hearing to determine if the child has in fact been abused, neglected, or is dependent;
and 3) if the court adjudicates the minor abused, neglected, or dependent, there is a dispositional
hearing to determine the best course of action-such as placing the minor in DCFS custody. See
supra Part 1IB.1 (detailing the procedural sequence in child protection cases). If the court
chooses to place the minor in a DCFS shelter care facility at the temporary custody stage, the
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custody, however, the court may still place the child with a suitable

relative or other person, the probation department, or "an agency for
care or placement."'

99

Moreover, DCFS states that the agency may elect

court also appoints DCFS as the minor's temporary custodian (upon the agency's request). 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2). DCFS can then become the minor's legal custodian at the
dispositional hearing if the court determines that the minor should be made a ward of the court
and that the proper disposition is to place the minor in DCFS care. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/222(1), 23(1), 27(l)(d). For the minor who was placed in DCFS's temporary custody and then
remains in DCFS care after disposition, the physical transition is seamless. A court might view a
minor who has received the agency's care while in temporary custody as "already in the legal
custody or guardianship of [DCFS)" and therefore eligible to remain in its care at the
dispositional phase. 705 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 405/2-23(l)(a)(1); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, §
304.4(d) (2002). But although DCFS's legal relationship to the minor as temporary custodian
carries with it the same responsibilities as if it was legal custodian, the Illinois legislature
recognizes the two as distinct legal categories. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5(m) (stating that as
temporary custodian, DCFS "shall have the authority, responsibilities and duties that a legal
custodian of the child would have ...
"). But see 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(1), 2-28(1)
(allowing the court to confer legal custody in child protection cases at the dispositional phase or
the placement hearings that follow). Regardless of whether DCFS was acting as temporary
custodian, the court must abide by the placement statute when deciding whether the agency
should become legal custodian or guardian, which clearly prohibits placing a teenage minor with
a delinquent past in DCFS custody. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(1)(d). While DCFS may
have fulfilled the responsibilities of a legal custodian during temporary custody, the placement
statute provides the only route in child protection cases for a court to bestow legal custody.
To embrace the view that a minor in temporary custody is already in DCFS legal custody upon
reaching the dispositional phase leads to arbitrary results. For example, consider two teenage
minors, A and B, who were both adjudicated delinquent when they were younger and later
abused. The court determines that it should take temporary custody of each minor. The court
places A in the temporary custody of a relative, but places B in DCFS's temporary custody
because B has no relatives who are willing to care for him (because the abuse is independent of
B's prior conduct, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2) allows the court to do so). At the
dispositional phase, if the court chooses to keep the children out of their homes, the court must
order both A and B into the legal custody of another entity. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-22, 23.
Under the reasoning that temporary custody equates with legal custody, B may remain in DCFS
care. But because A was placed with a relative-which most courts would find to be in any
minor's best interests, see 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(4.05) (recognizing the significance of a
minor's family ties in many factors that inform a court's "best interests" determination)-the
court would not be able to place the minor with DCFS at disposition, even if A's relative was no
longer able to care for her. Such a scenario not only undermines any substantive argument for
allowing a minor in temporary custody with DCFS to avoid the prohibition on DCFS care at the
dispositional stage, but also encourages judges to place any minor in A or B's place in DCFS's
temporary custody if they are concerned about the minor receiving DCFS services at disposition.
In many cases where the maltreatment is independent of a minor's delinquent history, DCFS
will likely choose to accept the minor for services, as its rules dictate. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
89, § 304.4(c) (2002) (stating that the agency may choose to serve children and families not
otherwise eligible for its services); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4(d) (granting eligibility to
minors thirteen or older where the maltreatment is independent of past delinquent conduct). But
upon placement, the express language of the statute proscribes these departmental rules. See
supra note 188 (describing rulemaking process and explaining that all rules must comply with
existing law); see also infra note 200 and accompanying text (questioning the validity of the
DCFS rule that gives the agency broad discretion to provide services to any minor it chooses).
199. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(l)(a)-(c).
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to serve children and families who would not otherwise qualify for its
services.' °°
2. Delinquency Cases

This section discusses the effect of the delinquency restrictions on
delinquency cases, both before and after adjudication.
a. Pre-adjudication

Prior to the 1995 restrictions, courts could order DCFS to provide
services to juveniles charged with delinquent conduct in Cook County,
which accessed DCFS care through two avenues: 1) the GYSI, which

placed nearly all minors referred to it in DCFS's care,2 ' or 2) if the
child was RUR and remained in detention for seven days, then the court

could order DCFS to place the minor in a "suitable place" while
awaiting adjudication.0 2 Outside of these two routes, some courts
would allegedly find the juvenile abused or neglected, even though he
was before the court on a delinquency petition in order to access DCFS
04
services. 2 °3 The 1995 restrictions closed the operation of the GYSI,
and although it is unclear what the immediate impact was on RUR
minors, the legislature replaced DCFS with DHS as the responsible
200. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4(c) (2002). It is unlikely that this rule would allow the
agency to take legal custody of a teenage minor with a history of delinquency. The placement
statute expressly prohibits a court from placing such a minor in DCFS's legal custody, with out
exceptions. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(d).
During the litigation that followed the initial 1995 delinquency restrictions, DCFS contended in
one case that, although the juvenile judges contravened the recent changes to the Act by placing
delinquent teens in DCFS custody, the agency is empowered to consent to custody of any minor
if it so chooses. In re C.T., 666 N.E.2d 888, 889-90 (I11.App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1996); see supra Part
IV.B.2 (discussing the cases that followed the creation of the delinquency restrictions). The court
soundly rejected DCFS's reasoning, holding that the Illinois legislature chose to completely
prohibit delinquent teens from entering DCFS care. In re C.T., 666 N.E.2d at 889-90. The 1996
amendment only changed the language in the temporary custody statute. See supra Part IV.C
(discussing the creation of an "independent basis" exception in temporary custody hearings). The
amendment states that an "independent basis ... must be defined by [DCFS] rule," but did not
empower DCFS with discretion to care for any minor it chooses. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/210. Without explicit sanction from the Illinois legislature, DCFS is unable to circumvent the
prohibition on placing delinquent teens in DCFS care at the dispositional phase, even if it
complies with the agency's internal rules. See supra note 188 (explaining the rulemaking
process).
201. See supra Part Ill.B (discussing the creation and purpose of the GYSI).
202. See supra Part III.C (discussing the lawsuit brought by "release upon request" minors
and the resulting agreement).
203. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing DCFS's assertion that
juvenile court judges were liberally allocating the state's child welfare resources to juvenile
delinquents).
204. See supra Part IV.B.1 (describing the effects of the delinquency restrictions on the
GYSI).
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agency for this population as part of the JJRA of 1998.205 The
restrictions effectively closed all pre-adjudication routes to DCFS
services.
b. Post-adjudication

The pre-1995 sentencing provisions enabled courts to place the minor
in DCFS custody, although the provisions required DCFS consent for
minors thirteen or over.0 6 With the passage of the 1995 delinquency

restrictions and the amendment that followed, however, a teenage minor
is completely barred from DCFS care once he has been adjudicated
delinquent. 20 7 The new restrictions require that any DCFS involvement
come through child protection proceedings.0 8
3. DCFS
Consistent with DCFS's emphasis on finding permanent safe homes
for children, the agency has drastically reduced the number of children
placed in residential care facilities since 1995. In the mid-1990s, the
agency began using residential care as a last resort for children, 20 9
resulting in fewer youths being placed in residential care with a higher

percentage

coming

from

more

restrictive

settings,

such

as

205. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998, Pub. Act 90-590, 1998 I11. Laws 1035, 1177
(codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-501(7) (2004)).
206. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-23(a)(1) (1994). The prohibition on DCFS involverfient
does not apply to minors under thirteen who are already DCFS wards when they are adjudicated
delinquent. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4(b)(3) (2002) (requiring DCFS to provide
services to those adjudged delinquent). If the child adjudicated delinquent is a DCFS ward, or is
under thirteen and placed under DCFS guardianship, the court has jurisdiction to order the child
into a specific residential placement and require DCFS, as the guardian, to pay for the placement.
See, e.g., In re O.H., 768 N.E.2d 799, 803 (I11.App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2002) (holding that the juvenile
court has jurisdiction to direct placement for juveniles). The court does not have jurisdiction to
order a specific placement in child protection placement hearings. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5740(1)(a)-(e) (2004).
207. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710(1)(a)(iv) (allowing only those under thirteen to be
placed in DCFS custody).
208. See In re E.F., 754 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2001) (holding that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to place a minor in DCFS custody at the sentencing hearing).
209. STEPHEN BUDDE ET AL., RESIDENTIAL CARE IN ILLINOIS: TRENDS AND ALTERNATIVES,
FINAL REPORT 5 (2004), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/category.archive-new.asp
?L2=61&L3=130. Prior to being placed in residential care in 2003, 39% of youth age twelve and
older came from a more restrictive setting, such as detention, the department of corrections, or
hospitalization.
STEPHEN BUDDE ET AL., RESIDENTIAL CARE IN ILLINOIS: TRENDS AND
ALTERNATIVES; INTERIM REPORT: DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS FROM ANALYSIS OF DCFS
ADMINISTRATIVE
DATA
10-11
(2004),
available at http://www.chapinhall.org/
category-.archive-new.asp?L2=61&L3=130 [hereinafter DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS]. The report
does not distinguish between each of the "more restrictive" placements nor does it account for
what percentage of the population was already in DCFS custody prior to residential placement.
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hospitalization or detention. Between 1995 and 2003, the statewide
residential care caseload for children ages twelve and older fell from
2,816 to 1,387-over a fifty percent reduction. 2 0 Along with these
shifts in the type of care that DCFS provides, has come greater stability
in the agency's budget: while the budget grew about 170% between
1991 and 1995,211 it has remained steady in the past five years.212
The underlying factors that contributed to these trends are not easily

discernible. Between 1995 and 2004, the number of children screened
into the child welfare system in Illinois dropped almost fifty percent,
which certainly affected the care DCFS provided and the agency's
overall expenditures.2 13 As mentioned above, changes in federal and
state laws were also likely catalysts for achieving permanency more
quickly.2 4 The role of the delinquency restrictions in effectuating these
changes is not clear, as there is no comprehensive data that describes the
number of youth that courts would have committed to DCFS care but
for the restrictions. Regardless of the causal links, DCFS advocated for
the delinquency restrictions in order to reduce its residential placement
population and stabilize its budget. Those two goals were achieved in
the years that followed the enactment of the restrictions.
V. ANALYSIS
DCFS lobbied for the 1995 delinquency restrictions in order to
stabilize its budget and redirect the flow of delinquent teenagers from
DCFS-funded residential placements to county-funded programs.2"' 2In
16
the intervening years, DCFS has successfully satisfied its fiscal needs
210. DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS, supra note 209, at 31. The residential care caseload for all
children fell from 4,015 to 1,683. Id. at 29. The study defined residential care to include both
institutional residential placements (IPAs) and group homes. Id. at iii.
211. See Testimony of Jess McDonald, supra note 141 (testifying that the budgetary needs of
the agency grew 170% from 1991 to 1995).
212. See DCFS, BUDGET BRIEFING: FY 2003 4 (listing the total funding for fiscal year 1999
at $1,392,638,100), available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/library/index.shtml (Feb. 2, 2002);
DCFS, BUDGET BRIEFING: FY 2005 4 (projecting budgetary needs of $1,406,207,800 in 2005, an
increase from 1999 of less than one percent), available at http://www.state.il.us/
dcfs/library/index.shtml (Feb. 18, 2004).
213. DCFS, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2004
4 (listing the number of indicated reports in 1995 at 53,246 and in 2004 at 27,489), available at
http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/library/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). A report of child
abuse or neglect is "indicated" when an investigation determines that credible evidence of the
reported abuse or neglect exists. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2002).
214. See supra Part III.A (noting the role of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 and
Permanency Initiative legislation in the focus on permanency).
215. See supra Part IV.A, C (discussing the reasons that DCFS favored the delinquency
restrictions).
216. See supra Part IV.D.3 (highlighting the reduction in residential placements and stable
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and many counties have developed a community-based "continuum of
intervention. '1 7 However, due to the drastic nature of the restrictions,
its effects go well beyond these intended results.
The current policy to withhold long-term DCFS care from teenagers
who have any history of delinquency is over-inclusive and stands in
contrast to the principles that otherwise guide the Juvenile Court,
specifically, to look at every aspect of the child. The ethos described by
Judge Julian Mack in the early days of the Juvenile Court continues to
pervade juvenile justice proceedings today.2"' The purpose and policy
of the Article that governs delinquent minors, as implemented through
the JJRA, is to restore the offending minor and the community he
belongs to according to the particular circumstances of each case.219
The mechanics of juvenile justice proceedings, as well as the predetention programs implemented through the IJDAI, 220 give flesh to this
particularized approach. From initial intake to discharge, the court is
empowered with options that recognize the unique strengths,
deficiencies, and needs of each child. If the minor requires preadjudication monitoring, courts in many counties can choose a program
that is best suited to the needs of the minor and community.22' Prior to
sentencing, the court may order a social investigation report that details
all aspects of a minor's life;222 at sentencing, the court may condition
probation upon very specialized requirements. 2 3 If the minor's parents
or custodians are unfit or unable to care for the minor, the court may
place the minor in a number of custodial or guardianship placements. 224
Even the eventual discharge of proceedings is based on the court's very
discretionary finding that it is in the "best interests" of the minor and the
public. 2 5
budget since the passage of the restrictions).
217. See supra Part II.B.2 (examining the range of community-based responses under the
Juvenile Justice Reform Act and the Illinois Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative).
218. See supra Part II.A (quoting Judge Mack, one of the prominent judges of the Cook
County Juvenile Court in its early years).
219. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing the theoretical approach of the JJRA).
220. See supra Part 11.B.2.a (discussing the creation of the IJDAI). Not all counties
participate in the IJDAI. See Ill. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, supra note 67, at 8
(showing a map of the thirty participating counties as of May 2003).
221. See supra Part II.B.2.a (summarizing the various programs available through the IJDAI).
222. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-701 (2002 & West Supp. 2003).
223. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715 (empowering the court to require a minor placed on
probation to comply with a number of terms, including a catch-all provision to "comply with
other conditions as may be ordered by the court").
224. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-740 (2002).
225. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-755 (2002). A "best interest" determination is based on a
variety of factors that account for the minor's physical and mental needs, as well as the minor's
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Against this backdrop, the binary operation of the DCFS delinquency
restrictions produces anomalous results.
The restrictions do not
promote a contextual perspective; rather, they constrain teenagers to one
category or the other when it comes to access to DCFS services. Such
an approach ironically mirrors the conduct that it was intended to
prevent: just as the provisions indiscriminately bar all delinquent
teenagers from DCFS care, so did juvenile courts indiscriminately use
DCFS resources for minors whose circumstances did not always
warrant the agency's involvement.
This Part challenges the legislation's underlying rationale for the
delinquency restrictions and then argues that the expansive nature of the
provisions has created results unintended by the legislature. The first
section argues that exempting DCFS from any responsibility to help pay
for the placement of troubled youth results from an oversimplified
perspective that reduces a minor to a single delinquent act and thereby
excludes any history of abuse or neglect. 226 The second section disputes
the claim that the delinquency restrictions merely implicate budget
issues and argues that DCFS has unique value to a child in need of a
home. 22 '
The final section highlights the limited nature of the
"independent basis" exception and suggests that the broad reach of the
restrictions seriously undermines any legitimate policy rationale.2 28
A. Flawed Rationale: Delinquent or Victim
The legislature enacted the statutory restrictions on placing
delinquent teenagers in DCFS care in response to perceived abuses of
DCFS resources by juvenile courts. 229 To DCFS, the GYSI embodied
these abuses most distinctly by using DCFS money (along with funding
from other agencies) to place delinquent youth in residential homes with
only initial court involvement.23 ° Outside of Cook County, DCFS
perceived that judges indiscriminately used the agency as a funding

place in his family and surrounding community. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(4.05) (2002).
226. See infra Part V.A (arguing that the delinquency restrictions are based on a
oversimplified perspective of delinquent youth).
227. See infra Part V.B (maintaining that the delinquency restrictions amount to more than
mere cost-shifting from DCFS to the counties because DCFS has unique value for the minor in
need of a permanent home).
228. See infra Part V.C (arguing that the "independent basis" exception in the temporary
custody statute has very limited benefit for minors with a delinquent past).
229. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (explaining that the delinquency restrictions
were enacted to stem liberal use of DCFS resources by juvenile court judges).
230. See supra Part IV.A (discussing DCFS's role in funding GYSI-placements as an impetus
for the delinquency restrictions).
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source for placing children in residential homes.23 ' The claim that
DCFS's relationship simply entailed paying for the placement and did
not involve any other casework highlighted that these were not the type
of minors that DCFS was intended to care for.2 32 Thus, the dispute was

much more about principle than about practicalities; it was not a matter
of determining who could provide more appropriate care (indeed,
neither the counties nor DCFS directly provided the residential
services), but whether the juvenile was more delinquent or victim. The
legislature clearly stated that absent a separate and distinct finding of
abuse or neglect, a teenage minor would always remain a delinquent in
the eyes of the state child welfare system.233
For the delinquent minor who has been abused or neglected, these
histories are not so easily differentiated. Experts have long debated the
strength and nature of the link between child maltreatment and
delinquency.2 34 Although the resolution of the issue is outside the scope
of this Article, a number of recent studies have demonstrated that early
child abuse and neglect significantly increased the risk of arrest as a
juvenile.235 Cook County records show that one out of every ten

231. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (quoting the testimony of Jess McDonald).
232. See David B. v. Patla, 950 F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (describing the operation of
the GYSI and stating that, because none of the defendant agencies operated the type of residential
facilities that most of the referred youth require, the children are typically placed with private
treatment providers who then bill the respective agencies for the cost, with DCFS bearing
approximately one-third of the cost).
233. See supra Part IV (tracing the legislative process that culminated in the current statutory
scheme); see also notes 172-74 (explaining the legislative and administrative process that
resulted in the current rule).
234. See DAVID N. SANDBERG, Testimony Submitted to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Juvenile Justice on "The Relationship between Child Abuse and Delinquency," in THE CHILD
ABUSE-DELINQUENCY CONNECTION 137, 138 (reporting that sixty-six percent of the youth at a
New Hampshire residential home for juvenile delinquents suffered abuse and advocating for
legislation that accounts for a history of maltreatment in delinquency proceedings). But see
James Garbarino & Margaret C. Plantz, Child Abuse and Juvenile Delinquency: What are the
links?, in TROUBLED YOUTH, TROUBLED FAMILIES 27, 27-39 (James Garbarino et al. eds., 1986)
(discussing the difficulty of reaching a conclusion about the connection between abuse and
delinquency due to methodological problems in earlier studies).
235. See Cathy Spatz Widom, UnderstandingChild Maltreatment and Juvenile Delinquency:
The Research, in UNDERSTANDING CHILD MALTREATMENT & JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 1, 2-5
(Janet Wiig et al. eds., 2003) (summarizing the results from four recent studies of the connection
between child abuse an neglect). The first study, conducted in a metropolitan county in the
Midwest, found that early child abuse and neglect increased the risk of arrest as a juvenile by
fifty-five percent, and increased the risk of being arrested for a violent crime by ninty-six percent.
Id. at 2. A second study conducted in Rochester, N.Y. reaped similar results, with childhood
maltreatment increasing the risk of being arrested as an adolescent by fifty percent. Id. at 2-3.
The fourth study found that a group of abused and neglected youth from the Northwest were
nearly five times more likely to be arrested as juveniles and eleven times more likely to be
arrested as violent offenders than their non-abused counterparts. Id. at 4.
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juveniles referred to court on a delinquency petition has been the subject
23 6
of an indicated report of abuse or neglect in the previous five years.
This statistic does not include any juveniles who suffered from abuse or
neglect that was not reported or indicated.237
A minor is barred from DCFS care by circumstances that are outside
of his control simply because the state did not discover he had been
abused or neglected until after he was charged with a delinquent act. If
someone had reported the maltreatment to the state prior to the
delinquency charges, the minor might have already have been receiving
DCFS care and thus would have remained eligible for further child
welfare services upon committing a delinquent act.2 38 Thus, two teens
with identical histories of abuse and delinquency can find themselves on
different sides of the door to DCFS services. The different outcomes
are not based on the conduct of the respective minors, but on the
chronological point of state intervention.
One potential justification for such divergent results for two similarly
situated minors is that DCFS, as the parent figure to those minors under
its care, has a continuing obligation to provide for its children regardless
of the child's conduct, just as an ordinary parent would. 23 9 Thus,
although the state does not view the two minors differently, it is bound
to fulfill a pre-existing duty to a child with whom it already has a
relationship.
However, in some instances the state bears a more direct
responsibility for a delinquent minor, even if there was no legal
relationship at the time the delinquent act was committed. Under the
current scheme, once the court places a DCFS ward in a permanent
236. CLARK M. PETERS ET AL., CASE PROCESSING AND SERVICES TO CHILDREN IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE DIVISION OF THE COOK COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 18 (2004), available at
http://www.chapinhall.org/ categoryarchive-new.asp?L2=61&L3=132 (last visited Apr. 12,
2005). See also ILL. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. AUTH., A PROFILE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
ACTIVITIES AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY RISK FACTORS IN COOK COUNTY 26-30 (reporting
that, statewide, there is a 0.29 and 0.26 correlation between child abuse and neglect and child
sexual abuse, respectively, and probation). The study also warns that, although the figures reveal
that prior abuse is a viable risk factor, past research reveals little evidence linking prior abuse to
future delinquency. Id. at 38.
237. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2004) (defining an "indicated report" as one where an
investigation determines that credible evidence of the alleged abuse or neglect exists).
238. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4(b)(4) (2002) ("The Department is mandated to
continue serving these children even if they are over age 13 when they are adjudicated delinquent
or minors requiring authoritative intervention."). See also supra note 35 and accompanying text
(explaining the process from initial report of suspected abuse or neglect to the decision to remove
a child from his or her home).
239. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 306.3 (2003) (providing the circumstances that prompt
DCFS to seek to end its legal relationship with children, which does not include a minor's
delinquent or otherwise difficult behavior).
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home through a guardianship or adoption, that child will not be able to
re-access DCFS services if the placement fails and there is any history
of delinquency.2 4° He stands in a no-man's-land, unable to stay with the
family that he was placed with, and unable to return to the state's care
because the placement effectively severed the child's relationship with
DCFS.24'
The eventual outcome is the same for a teen whose placement failed

because of some delinquent conduct and for a teen who was adjudicated
delinquent at a young age, and whose placement failed for some
unrelated reason. In the former scenario, Illinois law precludes DCFS
involvement because the neglect (the fact that his adoptive parents or

guardians no longer wish to care for him) arises "from the same facts,
incidents, or circumstances which give rise to a charge or adjudication
of delinquency.
,24' In the latter scenario, Illinois law limits DCFS
involvement to the ninety-day temporary custody period because,
although the neglect is independent of the minor's distant delinquent
conduct, the minor is no longer in DCFS custody and thus cannot reenter the agency's long-term care under the placement statute. 243

The inability to regain DCFS care after a failed placement is
particularly significant because, with the increased emphasis on

permanency (and the resulting increase in permanency rates) more
placements have failed244 and presumably, a substantial portion of these
240. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4(b)(4) (creating an exception only for delinquent
teens who were in DCFS custody prior to committing their delinquent conduct). An adoptive
parent or guardian may file a supplemental petition to reinstate wardship, but the court is not
obligated to reinstate wardship. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-33 (2002). However, even if the
court did reinstate wardship, because DCFS did not retain continuous custody, the court could not
require DCFS to provide care or services. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(l)(d) (2004); ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4(b)(4) (2002).
241. The Advocacy Unit provided the story of one youth that highlights the difficult situation
for a delinquent minor in a failed adoption. Chris's mother is addicted to drugs and his father is
incarcerated, and eventually Chris entered DCFS custody. When he was thirteen years old, his
paternal grandparents adopted him. Chris's paternal uncle sexually abused him in the adoptive
home. He ran away, is believed to have prostituted himself, and at age fifteen, committed
aggravated battery. His adoptive family is no longer willing to care for him. The Advocacy Unit
has determined that Chris needs specialized residential treatment, but DCFS is unwilling to
resume care for Chris, and the delinquency restrictions preclude the court from ordering DCFS to
do so.
242. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4(d) (2002) (stating the "independent basis" criteria that
would entitle a delinquent teen to DCFS services).
243. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(1)(d) (2002). See also supra note 198 (discussing how
the absence of an "independent basis" exception in the placement statute proves to be an absolute
bar on placing a delinquent teen in DCFS's legal custody, even if the minor was already placed in
DCFS's temporary custody).
244. See Dave Orrick, Rushing Into Adoption, THE DAILY HERALD, Sept. 21, 2004 (citing
statistics that show the number of adoptions significantly increasing since 1997, with the rate of
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failed placements are due to delinquent conduct by the minor or involve
a minor with a delinquent past. Barring access to DCFS services for
delinquent teens in failed placements has the potential of tainting the
placement process by foreclosing the long-term responsibility the
agency has to such youth. The restriction provides an incentive for
DCFS to place minors with delinquent histories or proclivities (who are
often more costly to care for) as quickly as possible by guaranteeing
that DCFS will not have a continuing obligation to the minor if the
placement fails after he turns thirteen.
For the more conscientious DCFS caseworker, the delinquency
restrictions curtail the effectiveness of the permanency legislation for
teenage youths who have a delinquent history or who exhibit delinquent
tendencies. 245 The worker wants to find the child a permanent home as
246
soon as possible, as Illinois law and DCFS policy urges her to do, but
she will make the decision with great caution knowing that the child
will not be able to return to DCFS if the placement fails. By allowing
eligibility regulations for delinquents to influence DCFS's placement
process, the Illinois legislature has added a bureaucratic layer to the
very human decision of placing a unique child in a safe and loving
home.
These scenarios do not compel the conclusion that DCFS has the sole
responsibility for all delinquent children who have suffered abuse or
neglect at some time in their pasts. Rather, they reveal how factually
complex each case is and that the child's needs, and the state's
obligation to provide child welfare services, are wrapped up in a
protracted history that cannot be so easily reduced to a single delinquent
act. The legislature's decision to remove DCFS from the range of
available options for delinquent teens ignores the reality that minors can
failed adoption remaining at about 1.2% annually), available at http://www.dailyherald.coml
speciallfosteringfrustration/daythreeside.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). The article also notes
that the figures are calculated from financial data that suggest the failure rate, but that DCFS does
not retain any failure data and these projections are not wholly accurate. Id. With the dramatic
rise in adoptions since the permanency initiatives of the mid-1990s, critics have charged that
DCFS pushes too hard for adoptions without providing adequate supports, resulting in a higher
rate of failed placements. See supra Part II.A (highlighting the emphasis on permanency and the
successful increase in permanent placements in the last seven years); see also Orrick, supra
(quoting critics of DCFS's efforts to push adoptions). DCFS has recently provided increased
post-guardianship and adoption services. DCFS, BUDGET BRIEFING: FY 2003 27 (2002),
available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfsllibrary/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). Although
there is no formal tracking system, the agency points to the fact that the only studies that have
been completed reveal that the failure rate has, at worst, remained constant. Orrick, supra.
245. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text (discussing the federal and state
legislation that focuses on promoting permanency in the child welfare system).
246. Id.
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simultaneously be both delinquent and maltreated.
B. The Unique Value of DCFS
Although lawmakers intended to eliminate DCFS's obligation to pay
for the residential placements of delinquent youths, the legislation
creates ramifications beyond mere cost-shifting. 47 DCFS involvement
has value beyond its financial resources. As the statewide agency that is
comprehensively involved in every aspect of child protection-from the
initial point of contact with the child welfare system to the eventual
placement of the child 24 8-DCFS
possesses unique expertise and
resources that would benefit any child in need of a safe and permanent
home. The fundamental philosophy of concurrent planning that informs
all case management decisions requires the type of macro-level
oversight that only DCFS possesses, and DCFS has developed extensive
guidelines and practices for expeditiously moving a child through the
child welfare system. 249 The purpose and policy statement for the entire
Act even assumes DCFS will serve a vital role in placing the child in a
permanent home.25 °
DCFS's expertise may be irrelevant to the delinquent housed in the
Department of Corrections or in a residential placement-the service he
receives will be the same regardless of who pays for it. The minor who
is discharged from one of these sites and cannot return home depends
upon the services that DCFS provides. When the court places a minor
in a residential placement, it is with the hope and expectation that the
minor will eventually return to an awaiting family. However, the
247. See Testimony of Rep. Spangler I!, supra note 171 ("This is a money issue and a money
issue only.").
248. DCFS receives and investigates reports of child maltreatment, decides when to refer
cases to local law enforcement and the state's attorney, and determines when to take protective
custody of the child. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 300 et. seq. (2002). Once a child is removed
from her home and placed with DCFS, the agency creates and oversees a service plan for the
child, with a view towards placing the child in a permanent home. See supra Part III.A
(discussing the type of casework DCFS provides to children placed in its custody). DCFS is also
responsible for licensing and regulating agencies and individuals that provide child welfare
services or child care. DCFS, Chapter One: An Introduction to Child Welfare in Illinois, in BEST
PRACTICES § 1.1.2 (2002), available at http://dcfswebresource.prairienet.org/downloadsbp/ (last
visited Apr. 12, 2005).
249. See generally DCFS, Chapter Two: Permanency for All Children, in BEST PRACTICES
(2002) (detailing the principles and application of permanency planning in agency casework);
DCFS, Chapter Six: Establishing Permanency for Children in Substitute Care, in BEST
PRACTICES (2002) (providing protocol for effective and expeditious permanency planning),
availableat http://dcfswebresource.prairienet.org/ downloads/bp/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
250. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2(1) (2002) ("[I]f the child is removed from the custody of
his or her parents, the Department of Children and Family Services immediately shall consider
concurrent planning.., so that permanency may occur at the earliest opportunity .... ).
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realities are not always so ideal.
It is not uncommon for a minor to successfully complete the terms of
his sentence (either at a residential placement or the Department of
Corrections), but to be unable to return home because his family is
unwilling or unable to take him back. This is one type of the more
broadly defined "lock-out" situation, where a youth, absent from his
home for a period, finds that his parent or guardian refuses to or cannot
A lock-out situation may constitute neglect or
care for him.25'
2 52 A dependent or
dependency, depending on the given circumstances.
253
neglected minor typically qualifies for DCFS services, but when his
family's refusal or inability to allow him to return home is inextricably
linked to his delinquency, the minor is not eligible for the agency's
In the House Committee hearings in 1996, DCFS
services.254
maintained that this result was justified because there were more
appropriate local programs, such as CCBYS, that were focused on
215
youth in "lock-out" situations.
The purpose of CCBYS, however, extends only to providing
intensive services aimed at reunifying families within a narrow
period.256 CCBYS acts as a triage system; it does not serve as a
substitute for the long-term planning that DCFS provides, but rather
257
If
keeps minors from entering the state's child welfare system.
welfare
child
the
from
minor
CCBYS does not successfully divert the
system by reunifying him with his family, and if the lock-out was
unrelated to any delinquent conduct, then CCBYS moves the minor to
258 But if
DCFS's care in order to provide him with long-term services.
the minor was locked out because of his delinquent conduct and
CCBYS's short-term efforts prove unsuccessful, then DCFS is not an
251. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (defining what is meant by "lock-out").
252. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (describing the conduct that constitutes
neglect and dependency).
253. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4(b) (2002).
254. ILL. ADMIN. CODE title 28, § 304.4(d). The provision states:
The Department shall not accept for care or services, or legal custody or guardianship,
of a minor 13 years of age or older for whom allegations or adjudication of abuse,
neglect or dependency arise from the same facts, incident or circumstances which give
rise to a charge or adjudication of delinquency unless the minor is already in the legal
custody or guardianship of the Department.
Id.
255. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (conveying DCFS's position that communitybased programs should be used to relieve the agency of the strain to care for locked-out minors).
256. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text (describing the CCBYS's role in
providing services to locked out minors).
257. Id.
258. Id.
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option.259 He must remain in the custody of the probation department or
another agency. 260 Even assuming that each of these placement options
(DCFS, probation department, or another agency) has adequate funding
to provide the minor with similar services, a non-DCFS placement
nonetheless deprives the minor of the unique DCFS resources that
would more capably facilitate placing him in a permanent home.
Minors who face more than short-term lock-out do not merely need
temporary shelter; they need a permanent home.
As some legislators pointed out in the discussions about the
delinquency restrictions, minors who are successfully discharged yet
have no home to return to suffer genuine neglect that would typically
trigger DCFS involvement.2 6' The minor's situation implicates DCFS
not only because he falls squarely within DCFS's statutory obligation to
help neglected youths, but also because DCFS could provide the most
appropriate care under the circumstances. Under the current statutes,
however, there is no framework that directs a decision-maker to look at
the specific circumstances of the case to determine whether DCFS
should be involved.
C. Temporary Custody as a Temporary Solution
Through the 1996 amendment, the Illinois legislature seemingly
intended to restore full access to DCFS care to teenage minors who
experienced abuse and neglect that was independent of any delinquent
conduct. 62 Legislators spoke of undoing the unfair effects of the
sweeping 1995 exclusion felt by independently mistreated minors. 63
Yet the "independent basis" exception applied only to the temporary
custody hearing, thereby creating a maximum ninety-day window of
eligibility for DCFS care. 264 Once the adjudicatory and permanency
259.
260.

ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 304.4(d) (2002).
See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-740 (2002) (providing placement options for a

delinquency court when the minor's parents are unfit or unable to care for the minor). See also

supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the parallels and differences between the placement hearings in
delinquency and child protection cases).
261. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (reporting the opinion that abandoning a child
when he is discharged constitutes one of the highest forms of neglect).
262. See 89TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 127 (March 27, 1996, I11.)
(statement of Rep. Spangler) ("[H.B. 2915] does nothing more than put the responsibility back on
the agency of DCFS to accept the juvenile that they should have taken in the first place.").
263. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the reasons underlying the legislature's decision to

create the "independent basis" exception).
264. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-14(b) (2002) (stating that "an adjudicatory hearing shall be
commenced within 90 days of the date of service of process"). If it is in the child's best interest
and good cause is shown, the court may extend temporary custody for up to an additional thirty
days. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-14(c).
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with the same
hearings have passed, DCFS involvement is precluded
6
1
restrictions.1
delinquency
original
force as with the
The inflexibility of the provision can lead to absurd results. After the
temporary custody period, a youth who committed a small offense when
266
he was very young, such as stealing change from a vending machine,
and then suffered severe abuse at age thirteen, is treated the same under
the delinquency restrictions as a sixteen-year-old with a long history of
criminal conduct. The placement statute in child protection cases does
not allow the court to account for the individual circumstances of a
teenager's delinquent history. Both are ineligible for long-term DCFS
26 7 This
care or services because both have been adjudicated delinquent.
result would create few practical consequences for the minor if the nonthe
DCFS placement alternatives-a suitable relative or other person,
''268 probation department, or "an agency for care or placement
provided the same expertise as DCFS, but DCFS provides a unique
range of services and casework. 269 By barring the child's access to
DCFS beyond ninety days, the legislature is significantly inhibiting the
minor's chances of finding a permanent home in a timely manner.
The outcome is even more egregious in the case of a DCFS ward
with a delinquent past who is later placed in a permanent home that fails
because of reasons unrelated to delinquency. This effectively gives the
minor one shot at permanency, because once his status as a DCFS ward
is removed, the current regime denies him the ability to re-access longterm DCFS care. This result becomes more significant in light of
criticisms that DCFS, because of its emphasis on permanency, too
eagerly forces children into guardianships or adoptions that have a poor
likelihood of success.27 °

Although the policy justifications given by legislators and DCFS for
265. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(1)(d) (prohibiting any minor over twelve who is charged
with a criminal offense or adjudicated delinquent from being placed in DCFS custody, with no
mention of an "independent basis" exception). See also supra note 198 and accompanying text
(discussing the application of the delinquency restriction in placement hearings in child protection
cases).
266. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-5 (2004). "Theft from coin-operated machines" is included
in the Criminal Code of 1961. Id.
267. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(l)(d) (2004) (preventing any court from placing any
minor over twelve who has been "adjudicated delinquent" in the custody of DCFS).
268. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing the placement hearings in child
protection proceedings, and discussing the court's different placement options).
269. See supra Part V.B (arguing that, regardless of the entity that bears the cost of paying for
a child's care, a minor who is kept from DCFS care is deprived of the agency's unique services
and expertise).
270. See Orrick, supra note 244 (reporting on the debate over DCFS's increased adoption
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the delinquency restrictions can help explain the statutory enactment,
the unrestrained nature of the provisions seriously undermines any
coherent policy rationale that purportedly supports their enactment.
Under the current framework, the maximum period that a court may
order DCFS involvement for any teenager whom a court has ever
adjudicated delinquent is ninety days.27' In the light of such a sweeping
restriction, the contours of any policy argument fade away.
As discussed above, the legislature enacted the original delinquency
restrictions in response to the juvenile courts that liberally used DCFS
resources to fund residential placements of delinquents.2 2 A tailored
response by the legislature could have constrained judicial indiscretion
by providing more rigid guidelines, or, if the lawmakers wanted to take
the decision out of the court's hands altogether, by prohibiting the
placement of certain types of offenders in DCFS care. Instead, the
legislature enacted provisions that do not draw any distinctions between
different types of offenses or offenders, but label all teenagers with
criminal histories "delinquent."

VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Regardless of whether the legislature's sweeping response to the
perceived abuses of DCFS resources represented good policy, it quelled
the abuses in bold terms and likely contributed to the agency's
stabilized budget.2 73 Moreover, by eliminating DCFS as an option for
delinquent youth, the legislature effectively forced local counties to
create community-based programming for juvenile delinquents.274 The
legislature achieved these results by completely restricting the flow of
delinquents into DCFS care, but in doing so, teenage delinquents who
are in genuine need of DCFS's involvement are inevitably denied it as
well.275 The systemic problems that gave rise to the rigid restrictions
have been ameliorated, and it is time to pursue a less stringent approach
that is more consistent with the goals and principles that have
historically guided Illinois' juvenile courts.
This Part recommends legislative changes to the existing juvenile
restrictions that will enable juvenile courts to more effectively address
271. See supra Part 1V.D. I (discussing the ninety-day limit on temporary custody).
272. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the conditions that resulted in the passage of the

delinquency restrictions).
273. See supra Part IV.D.3 (examining the long-term changes felt by DCFS in the years
following the delinquency restrictions).
274. See supra Part II.B.2.a (summarizing the various programs available through the IJDAI).
275. See supra Part V (discussing the shortcomings of the current statutory provisions in
providing long-term child welfare services for teenage delinquents).
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the complex child welfare issues that delinquent teenagers face.
Specifically, this Part suggests that, at the least, the legislature should
create an "independent basis" exception in the placement statute for
child protection cases.276 A better response would be for the legislature
to strike the delinquency restrictions altogether in child protection
proceedings because the initial abuse, neglect or dependency
77
determination acts as a sufficient safeguard on judicial indiscretion.
In the context of delinquency cases, this Part recommends that the
legislature modify both the pre- and post-adjudication statutes to enable
courts to utilize DCFS services when individual circumstances call for
it, while still safeguarding DCFS resources.278
A. Child ProtectionCases
In the child protection context, the legislature should at least allow
long-term DCFS involvement for teenage delinquents when there is an
independent basis of maltreatment. Currently, the independent basis
27 9
The
exception exists only at the temporary custody hearing.
placement
the
to
exception
the
extend
to
intended
have
may
legislature
of the minor,2 80 and juvenile courts may operate as if this is the case,28 '
but the placement statute specifically precludes placing a teenage
delinquent with DCFS after temporary custody.2 82 The placement
statute should be amended to ensure that any minor who is legitimately
maltreated would benefit from the state resources set aside to find
children safe and permanent homes.
A more drastic but superior solution is to remove the delinquency
restrictions altogether in child protection cases. 283 The purpose of child
protection proceedings is to identify children in need of state
276. See infra Part VI.A (recommending changes in the statutory scheme for child protection
cases).
277. See infra Part VI.A (arguing that the delinquency restrictions should be removed from
child protection proceedings).
278. See infra Part VI.B (recommending a framework for decision-making that allows for
DCFS involvement in delinquency cases when necessary).
279. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(2) (2004). See also supra Part IV.C (discussing the
creation of the "independent basis" exception at the temporary custody hearing).
280. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (stating that, although the exception was
created only in the temporary custody statute, legislators were concerned that DCFS accept for
care all minors who genuinely needed its services).
281. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (demonstrating that, although courts may
function as if a minor who was in DCFS's temporary custody may be placed in the agency's legal
custody after disposition, the placement statute expressly prohibits such an order for a delinquent
teenager).
282. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27(1)(d).
283. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10, 27(l)(d).
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intervention and ensure their well-being through appropriate services.
The legislature introduced the delinquency restrictions to constrain
juvenile judges that were otherwise indiscriminately utilizing the state's
child welfare resources. 284 Yet the child protection statutes already
contain effective constraints on judicial indiscretion by requiring that a
court find the minor abused, neglected, or dependent before the state
intervenes. 285 The solution should not be to narrow the scope of
eligibility, but to assure that the statutory definitions of abuse, neglect,
and dependency are faithfully applied. If the minor fits into one of
these categories as a threshold matter, the legislature should empower
the courts to pursue the ultimate goal of keeping a family intact or
placing the child in a safe and permanent home as quickly as possible.
Past delinquency does not diminish the state's interest in achieving this
goal.
B. Delinquency Cases
This section recommends that the legislature allow for DCFS
involvement both before and after adjudication in situations where
DCFS would provide the most appropriate care.
1. Pre-adjudication
A court may release a charged minor awaiting adjudication to his
286
home and require him to participate in detention alternative programs
or if the minor is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court or is a threat
to the community, the court may place the minor in a juvenile detention
facility.287 But an RUR minor lies somewhere in between: he does not
belong in detention but does not have a home to return to. 288 If the
minor's caretaker does not assume custody of him, the court may order
DHS to temporarily care for the minor until he is reunified with his
family. 289 But under DHS policy, the agency will only provide
284. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the concerns that drove the delinquency restriction
legislation).
285. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (outlining the statutory criteria for a
finding of abuse, neglect, or dependency); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10(1)-(2) (requiring

probable cause to believe a minor fits a statutory category of maltreatment before a court can take
temporary custody of the minor); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2-21(2) (requiring that a court enter a
finding as to whether the minor has been abused, neglected, or maltreated before deciding

whether the minor be made a ward of the court).
286. See supra Part 11.B.2.a (describing the origins and effect of the Illinois Juvenile
Detention Alternatives Initiative).
287. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-501(2) (2004).

288. See supra Part In.C (discussing the circumstances faced by RUR minors).
289. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-501(6).
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temporary care for a thirty-day period. 290 After thirty days, the minor
will have no place to go and could end up back in detention to await
adjudication.
The legislature should create a special provision in the detention
hearing statute 29 to address the situation where an RUR minor can no
longer remain in DHS care. Clearly, where a court has already
determined that a minor does not belong in detention, detention should
not be an option. The legislature could require that at the end of thirty
days in DHS care, the Probation Department, DHS, and DCFS hold a
collaborative meeting where they decide which entity is best suited to
care for the specific needs of the minor. The group would operate in a
similar manner to the GYSI but could have a more structured decisionmaking process to ensure that one entity does not always end up with
temporary custody of the minor; 292 in other words, the process would be
truly collaborative. Also, the process would likely be more workable
because the minor would only remain in temporary care until the family
is reunified or the adjudicatory hearing takes place and therefore there
would not be the specter of caring for the minor for an extended period.
2. Post-adjudication
Under the current sentencing statute, the legislature has foreclosed
DCFS custody as an option for teenagers adjudicated delinquent. 29' As
discussed above, the sentencing options do allow a court to place a
minor in the legal custody of another person or entity if he is not
committed to the Department of Corrections.294
And while the
placement statutes in delinquency and child protection proceedings
resemble each other, the two differ significantly in that the delinquency
statute neither emphasizes the minor's permanency nor does it list
DCFS as a placement option. 291
The legislature should act to create a similar emphasis on
permanency in delinquency placements as exists in child protection
cases. 296 Although permanency is not the court's primary concern in

290. STATE OF ILL. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 76, at
291. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-501.

§ A.4.a.

292. See supra Part IV.A (discussing DCFS's criticism of the GYSI program which
consistently placed referred minors in residential placement and required DCFS to pay one-third
of the placement costs).
293. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710(l)(a)(iv).
294. See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing placement options in delinquency cases).
295. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (examining the differing emphases in the
respective placement statutes).
296. See supra Part II.B. I (explaining the priority of permanency in child protection cases).
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delinquency cases, once the court determines that custody should be
stripped from the minor's parents or guardians because of their inability
to care for him, it triggers the same value that informed the state's
permanency initiative in the late 1990s 29 7-namely, that all children
deserve a safe and permanent home. The legislature could work
towards this goal in delinquency cases while still safeguarding DCFS
resources by taking two steps: (1) introduce permanency goals that
closely parallel those that already exist in child protection cases; and (2)
allow courts to place a minor in DCFS custody when the permanency
goal is one that DCFS would most capably work towards.
When a court decides to remove a delinquent minor from the legal
custody of his parent or guardian, it is not to punish the child, but is
because the caregivers "are unfit or are unable" to care for the minor.298
For a minor who is not sentenced to the Department of Corrections, the
rehabilitative and punitive aspects of the minor's sentence are addressed
through probationary orders.2 99 A court's decision to remove a minor
from his home in both child protection and delinquency cases does not
depend on the minor's conduct, but on the parents' ability to care for the
child and the minor's best interests. Moreover, just as the minor's best
interests are served through focused permanency goals in child
protection cases, 3°° so too will a goal-oriented placement statute benefit
a delinquent minor. Emphasizing permanency in delinquency cases
where a child has no home will not compromise the punitive or
rehabilitative elements of the minor's sentence-he will remain on
probation-but rather will recognize how fundamental a safe and
permanent home-life is to the well-being and future conduct of the
minor. By requiring delinquency courts to adopt a specific permanency
goal, it forces the court to plan ahead for the day the minor is no longer
a ward of the court, much the same way concurrent planning does in
child protection cases.
The legislature should not only create specific goals for these minors,
but should give courts the appropriate options and resources to
accomplish them. When DCFS is best suited to accomplish the goal
297. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text (discussing the changes in the child
welfare system brought about by federal and state laws that emphasized permanency).
298. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-740(l) (2004).
299. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710(l)(a)(i), 715. There are some sentencing alternatives to
the Department of Corrections that are not considered probation. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/5-710(1)(a)(iii) (requiring a minor to undergo substance abuse assessment and participate in
appropriate counseling); 710(l)(a)(ix) (ordering a minor to have a gang tattoo surgically
removed).
300. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28(2)(A)-(G) (requiring the court to adopt a
permanency goal for wards in child protection cases).

2005]

Denying Child Welfare Services to Delinquent Teens

979

because of its resources and expertise, it should be a placement option.
For example, if a teenage minor's goal is to have guardianship
transferred to a private individual,3 ' DCFS would be particularly adept
at providing the appropriate services. But if the minor's goal is to
remain in a residential home pending independence,3 2 DCFS's unique
expertise in finding a permanent home would not be as relevant.
The legislature could also tailor the statute to allay concerns that
courts would select a goal simply because it carries with it the option of
DCFS involvement. One possibility is to only allow DCFS involvement
after the teenager has been in the custody of another person or entity for
a specified period. This would ensure that DCFS is only enlisted when
the minor's situation cannot be remedied through alternative, short-term
measures. Another possibility is to prohibit any minor with specific
probationary conditions from entering DCFS care. This would exclude
minors with behavioral problems that DCFS is not equipped to address
while still allowing other minors to benefit from the agency's care. The
legislature could also forestall what it perceives as judicial indiscretion
by narrowing the scope of eligibility according to the minor's offense.
Recent transfer laws under the JJRA already exclude minors who
commit more egregious offenses, such as first-degree murder or
aggravated criminal sexual assault, from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.303 Lawmakers could enumerate further offenses that would
disqualify minors who remain in juvenile court from DCFS care.
The use of permanency goals recognizes that, for some youth, a
delinquent act is just one step in a deteriorating home life, and that part
of restoring both the youth and the community is to ensure that the
minor is returned to a safe and permanent home. In some instances,
DCFS will possess the most appropriate resources to meet the specific
goal. The legislature should create a more nuanced permanency statute
that enables courts not only to discern when these situations exist, but
also to enlist DCFS's aid when they do. The discretion need not be
unchecked-the legislature could constrain or expand the court's
discretion using specific eligibility criteria. Such an approach would
honor the juvenile court's heritage by allowing each judge to
individually assess the needs of each minor who appears before the
court.

301.
302.
303.

705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28(2)(E).
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28(2)(F)-(G).
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130, 805.

980

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

VI. CONCLUSION

The unyielding delinquency restrictions that the Illinois General
Assembly implemented in 1995 and 1996 hide a whole class of minors
behind a blanket label of delinquency and deny them access to DCFS
services. This measure drastically departs from the Illinois Juvenile
Court's critical guiding principles, which direct a judge to make
individualized decisions based on the totality of the minor's life. The
Illinois legislature should bring the current restrictions into conformity
with those principles by allowing a judge to look at the complexities of
each minor's case and make a particularized finding as to whether
DCFS involvement would benefit the minor.
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